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I. INTRODUCTION
“A man's house is his castle.”1 That was the point William Pitt2
was making in his speech to Parliament in 1763 when he stated:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of
the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow;
the storm may enter, the rain may enter, but the King of England
may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement.3

The development of the ideas embodied in the Fourth
Amendment have rich historical background rooted in American
and English experience, growing specifically from the events
preceding the American Revolution.4 The coupling of the fiction that
a man's home is his castle together with the events of the Revolution
spawned the Fourth Amendment.5
The repugnance towards unlawful searches and seizures is
based in the interest in protecting a man's privacy and property. 6
Thus, when a man is in his home, his expectation of privacy is at its
zenith.7 While these lofty ideals ultimately became enshrined in the
Fourth Amendment, little was said as to how they would be
protected. American courts have historically been the guardians
against constitutional abuses. However, in the Fourth Amendment
arena, until the emergence of the exclusionary rule, there was no
clear mechanism to protect the interests that were enshrined into
the Fourth Amendment by our founding fathers.8
Starting in the early 1970s, The United States Supreme Court
has chipped away at the protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment.9 The Supreme Court has accomplished this primarily
1. Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fourth Amendment, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 79, 80
(1999).
2. William Pitt was a Member of Parliament and a British statesman of the Whig
group during the middle to late 18th century. See Arthur Burns, History of
government: Past Prime Ministers, GOV. UK (Sept. 16, 2015) https://history.blo
g.gov.uk/2015/09/16/william-pitt-the-younger-whigtory-1783-1801-1804-1806.
3. See Levy, supra note 1, at 79; See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1 (5th ed. 2015) (quoting
William Pitt’s Eloquent Remarks stating “they will never cease to be quoted.”).
4. See LaFave, supra note 3, § 1.1 (quoting a leading Fourth Amendment scholar).
5. Id.; see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (noting that the
maxim that every man’s house is his castle is made part of the fourth amendment to
our constitution in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and
has always been held to high value by the citizens of the U.S.)
6. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967) (explaining the goals
of the Fourth Amendment); See also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,49-50
(2012) (stating the two interests protected by the Fourth Amendment).
7. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (one of the principal goals of the Fourth
Amendment was historically to keep the government out of citizens' homes).
8. See generally Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383 (noting that federal exclusionary rule was
not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment).
9. See Timothy P. O'Neill, Fresh Look at Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
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through adopting numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule.10
These exceptions were born out of the increasingly cramped
analysis employed by the Supreme Court in determining when to
apply the exclusionary rule. However, the fact that the Supreme
Court has been trending this way does not necessitate that Illinois
courts must follow suit on this particular issue. 11 This remains true
despite Illinois courts considering themselves to be in "lockstep"
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the search and seizure
clause of the Fourth Amendment.12
This comment will argue that Illinois courts (1) are not
restricted by their own judicially imposed lockstep doctrine from
applying the exclusionary rule based on Article I Section 6 ("state
exclusionary rule" herein);13 and (2) should specifically apply the
state exclusionary rule as the remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations (and Article I section 6 violations) instead of the
exclusionary rule based on the language of the Fourth Amendment
("federal exclusionary rule" herein),14 which currently offers Illinois
residents, and specifically criminal defendants, less constitutional
protection.15
Part II begins with the historical origins of the interests
embodied in the Fourth Amendment. Part II then discusses Illinois'
constitutional analogue to the Fourth Amendment currently
embodied in Article I Section 6 of the Illinois constitution (state
search and seizure provision). This discussion includes background
on the emergence of Illinois' judicially imposed "lockstep doctrine"
as a way to interpret Article I Section 6. Finally, Part II discusses
the emergence and development of the federal exclusionary rule and
the state exclusionary rule as remedies for Fourth Amendment and
Article I Section 6 violations, respectively. 16
eyes two wrongs, 161 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 107 (June 2, 2015) (noting exclusionary
rule is on shaky grounds).
10. See id.(discussing history of U.S. Supreme Court exceptions to the
Exclusionary rule).
11. See generally Timothy P. O'Neill, "Stop Me Before I Get Reversed Again": The
Failure of Illinois Appellate Courts to Protect Their Criminal Decisions from United
States Supreme Court Review, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 893, 915 (2005).
12. Id.; See also Ill. Const. Art. II, § 6 (1870) (prior to 1970, the search and seizure
clause was contained here).
13. See generally People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 (1923) (giving birth to the
Illinois exclusionary rule based on the Illinois state constitutional provisions). The
United States Supreme Court has consistently said that whether there was a
constitutional violation and whether to apply the remedy are completely separate
questions for the courts to decide. Id.
14. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393 (stating the federal exclusionary rule has its
constitutional basis in the Fourth Amendment).
15. I will refer to the exclusionary rule that arises out of Article I section 6 as the
state exclusionary rule. Similarly, I will refer to the exclusionary rule that arises out
of the Fourth Amendment as the federal exclusionary rule. Despite the similarity in
language, both provisions have distinct rationales for their application.
16. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (before the United States
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states, states were
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Part III starts by discussing the threshold question of whether
Illinois' "limited lockstep" doctrine bars application of the state
exclusionary rule. Part III will then consider the United States
Supreme Court's current jurisprudential basis for applying the
federal exclusionary rule. Then Part III will consider the
jurisprudence of the state exclusionary rule. Specifically, the
differing jurisprudential bases that Illinois courts have employed in
determining the applicability of the state exclusionary rule, as
compared to the federal exclusionary rule. The main result is that
Illinois' state exclusionary rule is more broadly applicable to Article
I Section 6 (and thus Fourth Amendment) violations than the
federal exclusionary rule.
In Part IV, this comment will first propose that Illinois courts
are not constrained to apply the analytical framework the Supreme
Court applies in determining the applicability of the federal
exclusionary rule when applying the state exclusionary rule.
Second, part IV will propose that Illinois courts should specifically
apply the more constitutionally protective state exclusionary rule
as the remedy for Fourth Amendment and Article I Section 6
violations.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

Pre-Constitutional Notions of Search and Seizure

Search and seizure by the government without good cause or
reason was not always repudiated in England and in the American
Colonies.17 A cursory look into English history and the early years
of the American Colonies regarding the government’s use of general
warrants and writs of assistance will help explain the notions that
gave rise to the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the following
paragraphs will expound on these events which aid in any

forced to rely on their own constitutional provisions to protect their citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures).
17. See generally WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND
ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791, 27 (2009) (giving a historical account of the notion of
search and seizure in England Prior to the American Revolution noting that prior to
1485 there were almost no limits on search and seizure and also that there was no
concept of unreasonable search and seizure). The notion of search and seizure began
to develop rapidly between 1485 and 1642. Id. During this time, the Crown began to
authorize general searches to be used as a powerful weapon of social, political,
economic, and intellectual control. Id. Everything from “the food an Englishman put
into his mouth and the cap that he wore on his head to the thoughts circulating in
his mind cam to furnish legal pretexts” for a general search warrant. Id. Thus,
proprietors of the homes being searches began to perceive this proliferation of
searches as excessive and began to formulate the concept of unreasonable searches
and seizures. Id.

2017]

Illinois Should Apply State Exclusionary Rule as a Remedy

401

interpretation of what is meant by "unreasonable search and
seizure."18
The use of general warrants in England began in the fifteenth
century.19 General warrants allowed the government, through its
agents, to search or seize without specifying what was to be
searched, or what was to be seized.20 Under the authority of general
warrants, any officer of the King, on the basis of mere suspicion,
could search and seize wherever, whatever, and whomever they
wanted.21 These officers could do this in order to, for example, collect
royal revenues or taxes.22
Writs of assistance were a form of general warrant authorized
by English Parliament in 1662, and became applicable for use in the
American Colonies in 1696.23 These writs empowered a customs
official to enter any house, shop, cellar, warehouse, room or other
place and break open doors, chests, trunks and other packages to
seize any uncustomed goods. 24 To make matters worse, the writ of
assistance lasted for the life of the sovereign whom they were issued
under.25 As a result, they constituted a long-term license for custom
officials, at their sole discretion, to search or seize anyone they
thought to be smugglers.26
In the American Colonies, there was a turning point for
acquiescence of writs of assistance in 1761, when the high court in
Massachusetts heard arguments in the Paxton case.27 That year,
King George II died, and the writ of assistance issued under his rule

18. See generally People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d. 147, 161 (Ward J., dissenting)
(stating that the fundamental principle of constitutional construction is that effect
must be given to the intent of the framers and people who adopted it and that all
other principles of construction are only guideposts).
19. See CUDDIHY, supra note 17.
20. See ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS: A REFERENCE
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 5 (2003) (noting that it was not
necessary to designate a person or place in the warrant although it typically was
done); see also CUDDIHY, supra note 17.
21. Id.
22. See Levy, surpa note 1 at 81 (stating what general warrants for used for, in
general).
23. See generally BLOOM, supra note 20, at 5 (noting that the Navigation Act of
1662 authorized writs of assistance to search anywhere for uncustomed goods and
that by 1696 an Act of William III made writs applicable to the Colonies).
24. James M. Farrell, The Writs of Assistance and Public Memory: John Adams
and the Legacy Of James Otis, 79 THE NEW ENG. Q. 533, 535 (2006) ( explaining that
writs of assistance had been part of legal culture in the colonies since 1696 when
parliament pasted the "Act for preventing Frauds and regulating Abused in the
Plantation Trade" giving the custom agent the power to conduct a general search
without first appearing before a magistrate to establish probable cause for illegality);
see also, Levy supra note 1, at 85 (discussing history surrounding the Paxton case).
25. See Farrell, supra note 24, at 535
26. See id.
27. Paxton's Case, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761); see Farrell, supra note 24, at 533; see
also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 363 (1987) (O'Connor J., dissenting) (quoting
Paxton case).

402

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:397

expired.28 Consequently, a new sovereign had to issue a new writ of
assistance for the writ to remain valid. 29 Attorney James Otis
appeared on behalf of the people of Boston to argue against their
issuance.30 In his argument to the court, Otis denounced writs as
“an instrument of slavery…of arbitrary power, the most destructive
of English liberty and of the fundamental principles of the
constitution."31 Otis further stated that these writs were so
destructive to liberty because they placed "the liberty of every man
in the hands of every petty officer."32 Otis' ultimately lost his case
and the new writs were issued;33 his arguments however, proved to
be on the winning side of history.34
Otis' arguments are recognized as a significant driving force
behind the ideas ultimately enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. 35
The Paxton case, together with two other similar and important
developments that followed the Paxton case, the Wilkes cases36 and
the Carrington Case,37 form the conceptual basis of the Fourth
Amendment.38 Evidence of this is found in a memoir of John Adams,

28. See CUDDIHY, supra note 17, at 379-81 (stating the controversy between two
customs officers desire to obtain new writs after the King’s death and the association
of prominent merchants from Boston who opposed the issuance of the new writs
giving rise to the Paxton case).
29. See Farrell, supra note 24, at 535 (stating that a 1702 law required that all
writs issued under the name of the deceased sovereign had to be renewed within six
months by his successor).
30. See generally Levy, supra note 1 (discussing James Otis and the historical
relevance of the arguments that Otis made prior to the American Revolution). James
Otis was an attorney in Boston in the late 1700's. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (discussing history of the
developments that led to the framing of the Fourth Amendment); see also Levy, supra
note 1 (noting that Otis was actually mischaracterizes the law in England but was
doing it in order to make his point which apparently, was a common technique
amongst lawyers at this time).
33. See Levy, supra note 1.
34. See id. (noting that the fact that Otis lost is negligible, since his arguments
are what made history); See also Krull, 480 U.S. at 363 (quoting Paxton' Case ("I will
to my dying day oppose with all the powers and faculties God has given me, all such
instruments of slavery on the one hand, and villainy on the other, as this writ of
assistance is.").
35. Id.
36. See generally Levy supra note 1, at 86-8. The Wilkes cases were published in
newspapers from Boston to Charleston and all throughout the colonies and served as
a personification of constitutional liberty. Id.
37. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765); See also Boyd, 116 U.S.
at 623-30 (1886) (noting this case was familiar to every American statesman during
the revolutionary and formative period of the United States and considered "this
monument of English freedom . . . [a] true and ultimate expression of constitutional
law [that] may confidently [be] asserted that its propositions were in the minds of
those who framed the fourth amendment . . . and were considered sufficiently
explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures."); accord
Levy, supra note 1.
38. See CUDDIHY, supra note 17.
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one of the members who attended the Paxton proceedings.39 In fact,
Adams found Otis' arguments so significant, he declared "Otis was
a flame of fire… then and there was the first scene of the first act of
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain." 40 There is a
direct progression from Otis' arguments in the Paxton case, to the
framing of Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts declaration of
rights of 1780 by John Adams.41 Further, James Madison's
introduction of the proposal that became the Fourth Amendment
borrowed largely from John Adams’ framing of Article Fourteen of
the Massachusetts constitution.42
In 1776, the year the Declaration of Independence was signed,
there was a monumental shift in legal opinion that resulted in the
massive repudiation of general warrants. 43 The first example of this
repudiation was in June of 1776 when Virginia adopted a
declaration of rights in which Article 10 read:
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence are
grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.44

Subsequently, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Hampshire and
Massachusetts adopted their own constitutional declaration of
rights.45 Notably, Massachusetts' declaration of rights established a
newfound right for its citizens to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.46
However, when the United States Constitution was signed at
the Philadelphia Convention on September 17, 1787, it did not
39. See Levy, supra note 1.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 90. This differed from the Act of 1696 which provided that writs of
assistance would be issued from England's court of Exchequer. Id.
43. See id. at 90. For instance, law books began recommending specific warrants
which were given to justices of the peace and there was a shift in rhetoric in the
colonies. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. Significantly, John Adams attended the Paxton trial, heard Otis’
arguments, and then drafted article 14 of the Massachusetts bill of rights. Id.
46. See id. at 90-6 (giving a chronology of the bill of rights in various colonies).
Not all states had constitutions however. Id. And the ones that did, even if they had
search and seizures clauses, did not necessarily abide by them. Id. Connecticut, in
particular, had no constitution but its highest court in 1787 held that general
warrants, at least in cases involving theft, are clearly illegal thus giving rise to the
notion of probable cause. Id. Rode Island and Connecticut did not have a state
constitution by 1782. Id. New jersey had one, but did not have a search and seizure
clause; Maryland, New York, North and South Carolina and Georgia still employed
general searches specifically to enforce their impost laws. Id.; Frisbie v. Butler, 1
Kirby (Conn.) 231, 235 (1787) (theft case in which the complainant sought a general
warrant to search all places of the accused for his lost pork meat and the court finding
this to be void because it was not particular and also suggesting that there was no
probable cause for to suspect that Frisbie took the meat).
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include a Bill of Rights analogous to any of the state constitutions
previously mentioned.47 Thus, the people of the United States of
America were not protected from unreasonable searches or seizures
from the federal government. However, when congress met in June
of 1789, proposals to add a bill of rights were considered.48 James
Madison compiled many recommendations from the state ratifying
conventions for Congress to consider. Eventually, congress adopted
12 proposed amendments which were sent to the states, and then
ultimately ratified.49 One of the proposals sent out by Madison read:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.50

Once ratified by the states, this proposal became the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In sum, the protections embodied in what ultimately became
the Fourth Amendment arose to protect the citizenry against the
use of general warrants and writs of assistance. Notably, however,
the Framers did not include any specific mechanism within the
Fourth Amendment to enforce violations of the rights contained
therein.51 It would be up to the American courts to decide the
appropriate remedy for constitutional violations of the Fourth
Amendment.

B.

Illinois' Analogue to the Fourth Amendment

State constitutions serve as an independent basis for
protecting the rights of the people from the state government.52
However, unlike some of the several states before the formation of

47. See also Levy, supra note 1, at 96 (noting which states had constitutions prior
to signing of the constitution).
48. Id.
49. Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, The Bill of Rights--Its Origins and Its
Keepers, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 187 (1991). Madison compiled over 200 proposals from
state ratifying conventions and congress ultimately adopted a proposed bill of rights
containing 12 amendments. Id.
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (this was the final expression of the committee
which was proposed and ultimately adopted formally to become the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1791).
51. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (noting that the
fourth amendment is a judicially created remedy designed to safe guard the fourth
amendment rights through its deterrent effect and thus whether a violation of the
fourth amendment happened and whether to apply the remedy for the violation are
two separate questions).
52. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (stating that decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court "are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights
guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law.").
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the United States Constitution, Illinois did not have a constitution
until 1818, roughly 40 years after the United States Constitution
was adopted.53 Additionally, when Illinois finally adopted a
constitution, the protections afforded to the people of Illinois were
significantly less in the realm of search and seizure. 54 Furthermore,
since the Fourth Amendment did not yet apply to the states, the
people of Illinois were less protected from search and seizure by the
state government.55
However, by 1870, a new constitution was adopted in Illinois.
The search and seizure clause in this constitution was contained in
Article II section 6. It read:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause,
supported by affidavits, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.56

Illinois' language was nearly identical to that of the Fourth
Amendment save “supported by affidavits" in section 6 for "oath or
affirmation” in the Fourth Amendment.
A century later, in 1970, Illinois adopted its current
constitution.57 The relevant search and seizure clause now
contained in Article I Section 6 reads:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches,
seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by
eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue
without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.58

53. ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION, A REFERENCE GUIDE 3
(2010) (giving background information on the first Illinois constitution). One of the
requirements for forming a new state is that it have a constitution. Id. The original
Illinois state constitution of 1818 did have a search and seizure clause and read:
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general
warrants whereby an officer may be commanded to search suspected places
without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, whose offenses are not particularly described and supported by
evidence, are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be granted.
Id.

54. See Ill. Const. art. VIII § 7 (1818) (Illinois's first state constitution).
55. See id. (clearly Illinois' original search and seizure clause lacked the force
of the Fourth Amendment in that it uses the language "ought not" instead of
"shall not.").
56. Ill. Const. art. II. § 6, (1870).
57. Ill. Const. art. I. § 6, (1970).
58. Id.
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The new search and seizure clause added two new substantive
rights not found in the Fourth Amendment or the prior 1870
constitution of Illinois:59 (1) "invasions of privacy"60 and (2)
"interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
means."
Despite the changes made to the search and seizure provision
now contained in Article I Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution,
again there was no mechanism for enforcing the constitutional
provisions contained therein.61 Furthermore, the changes it made
in Article I Section 6 departed from the language of the Fourth
Amendment and Article II section 6 of the 1870 constitution. 62 This
gave rise to interpretative issues with regard to the Article I Section
6. The following section will discuss how Illinois courts dealt with
these interpretative problems.63

59. See Lousin, supra note 53. Regarding the first change from "effects to "other
possessions" the committee notes state: "this is a clarifying amendment that gives
expression to the effect of court decisions on the scope of the freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure. Id.; see also, Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois
Constitutional Convention, 30 (December 1970- September 1970) (this amendment
to the search and seizure clause of the 1870 constitution was primarily to give effect
to the scope of court decisions in Illinois that have defined effects as other
possessions); see also, Lousin, supra note 53, at 48; Accord, ELMER GERTZ, FOR THE
FIRST HOURS OF TOMORROW: THE NEW ILLINOIS BILL OF RIGHTS, 88 (Joseph P.
Pisciotte ed., 1972).
60. See Lousin, supra note 53. The change to the search and seizure clause adds
the words "invasions of privacy" to the clause creating the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure. Id. The committee notes state: "the committee
concluded that it was essential to the dignity and well-being of the individual that
every person be guaranteed a zone of privacy in which his thoughts and highly person
behavior were not subject to disclosure or review." Id. The committee reasons that it
was doubtless that any person who chooses to enjoy the benefits of living in an
organized society who enjoy the privacy he could enjoy if he were to live away from
the institutions of government and therefore the committee inserted the right to
privacy clause in order to protect individuals from government intrusion in the
future with the development of new technology. See Record of Proceedings, supra
note 59, at 31; see also, Gertz, supra note 59, at 168 (noting that the addition of the
privacy clause has rebuked "Big Brother" which is important in an age when people
are dwarfed, stifled, and made to fear by the intrusions in their personal lives Illinois
has gone beyond any other constitution in strengthening the privacy of an
individual).
61. Ill. Const. art. I § 6 (1970).
62. See id. (adding two substantive rights not contained in the Fourth
Amendment).
63. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (holding that whether probable
cause is established under the Fourth Amendment by an informant's tip is
determined by the totality of the circumstances). This case illustrates an example of
an interpretative issue between the Fourth Amendment. See id. The issue is whether
the Fourth Amendment has been violated for lack of probable cause. Id.
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C. Emergence of the Illinois' "Limited Lockstep
Doctrine" as a Way to Interpret Article I Section 6
The United States Constitution established a federalist form of
government.64 Accordingly, there are two layers of constitutional
protection: state and federal.65 Although seemingly counterintuitive, two constitutions do not necessarily require two separate
interpretations by the state or federal courts.66 In fact, if a state is
considered in "lockstep" with a particular federal constitutional
provision, there will be no need to interpret the analogous state
constitutional provision independently.67
Illinois, as of 2006, is considered to be in "limited lockstep" with
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment.68 In general, a lockstep doctrine asserts that where
there is substantially similar language in a state constitutional
provision, state judges must interpret their state constitutions
based on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of those
analogous federal provisions. 69 However, there are different
variations of lockstep, and Illinois has its own version that it applies
in a specific way based on its own jurisprudence.70
64. See generally U.S. Const.
65. Compare, U.S. Const. amend. IV with, Ill. Const. art. I § 6 (1970).
66. See Timothy P. O'Neill, Escape from Freedom; Why " Limited Lockstep"
Betrays Our System of Federalism, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 329 (2014) ("freedom
is enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one" and that each state is free
to interpret their own constitution to go beyond the minimum guarantees of the
federal constitution) (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)).
67. See O'Neill, supra note 11 (describing lockstep as a state supreme court's
determination that when its own state constitution contains a provision similar to
one found in the federal constitution, it will interpret its state provision in the exact
same manner as the United States Supreme Court interprets the federal provision).
68. People v. Caballes, 851 N.E. 2d 26 (2006).
69. See generally Honorable John Christopher Anderson, The Mysterious
Lockstep Doctrine and the Future of Judicial Federalism in Illinois, 44 LOYOLA U.
CHI. L.J. 965, 66 (2013) (giving a brief background on what the lockstep doctrine
posits).
70. See James K. Leven, A Roadmap to State Judicial Independence Under the
Illinois Limited Lockstep Doctrine Predicated on the Intent of the Framers of the 1970
Illinois Constitution and Illinois Tradition, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 63, 67 (2012) (stating
Illinois is considered a "limited lockstep" state). In general, there are three basic
analytical frameworks that have courts have employed in giving meaning to state
constitutional provisions analogous to a federal constitutional provision. Id. These
methods are: (1) the strict lockstep approach; (2) the interstitial approach; and (3)
the primacy or primary approach. Id.; see also Caballes, 851 N.E. 2d 26 (noting there
are three scenarios when considering the relationship between the state and federal
constitution: (1) a provision may be unique to the state constitution and thus there
is interpreted without reference to federal counterpart; (2) a provision in the state
constitution is similar to that in the federal constitution in which case the language
must be given effect; (3) the provision of the state constitution may be identical or
synonymous with the federal counter part).
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In Illinois, the adoption of the lockstep doctrine was unsettled
for a long time. One of the first cases asserting that Illinois courts
should be in lockstep with the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment found that both provisions
are "in effect the same…[and] are construed alike." 71 However, in
1970, the issue arose again with more force, since the 1970 Illinois
constitution contained two additional substantive rights that the
Fourth Amendment did not explicitly contain.72
The case addressing this issue was People v. Rolfingmeyer.73
The issue in Rolfingmeyer was whether the Illinois Vehicle Code's
implied consent section violated the self-incrimination provisions of
the Illinois and Federal Constitutions.74 In resolving this issue, the
court was met with the choice of whether to continue to adhere to
the "lockstep" doctrine under the new constitution.75 In reaching its
decision, the court relied primarily on the intent of the Illinois
constitutional framers of the 1970 constitution, stating “[t]here is
nothing in the proceedings of the constitutional convention [of
Illinois] to indicate an intention to provide . . . protections against
self-incrimination broader than those of the Constitution of the
United States."76 However, the majority was criticized for following
the United States Supreme Court automatically merely because
there is a comparable provision in the state constitution.77

71. People v. Tillman, 1 Ill. 2d 525, 530 (1953). In Tillman the court based its
holding on the provisions of Article II Section 6 of the 1870 Constitution. Id.; Ill.
Const. art. II, § 6 (1870).;
72. Ill. Const. art I § 6, (1970). The new substantive rights arguably expanded
the search and seizure clause of Article I Section 6. See id.
73. People v. Rolfingsmeyers, 101 Ill.2d 137 (1984); see also, Anderson, supra
note 69 (giving analysis on the Lockstep issue discussed in Rolfingsmeyer).
74. See generally Rolfingsmeyers, 101 Ill.2d 137.
75. Caballes, 851 N.E. 2d 26 (giving history of lockstep doctrine); see also
Tillman, 1 Ill. 2d 525, (noting that Illinois was in lockstep with the federal
constitution).
76. See Rolfingsmeyers, 1 Ill. 2d 525 (stating in addition that there had been
proposals to alter the language of the section but ultimately that the existing state
of the law would remain unchanged).
77. See id. (Simon J., concurring) (noting also the instructions given to the
delegates by Professor Paul Kauper "a state supreme court is free to give the
freedoms recognized in the state constitution a reach that transcends interpretations
given the fundamental rights by the United States supreme court…a state is free to
develop its own higher standard."). Justice Simon also stated that in reaching their
decision, the Majority presumed that the state constitution has the same content as
the comparable provision in the federal constitution unless there is some indication
to the content in the constitutional convention proceedings. Id. This is “an
assumption which is incorrect and inverts the proper relationship between state and
federal constitutions.” Id. The sentiment of the concurrence was that the court is not
bound to automatically follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
when interpreting comparable provisions of the state and federal constitution. Id.
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In People v. Hoskins the court came out with stronger language
suggesting it was adamant about construing the Fourth
Amendment and Article I Section 6 in similar fashion. 78 The court
found that "any contention that it was intended that [Article I]
section 6 of the Bill of Rights in our own constitution was to be
interpreted differently the Supreme Courts interpretations of the…
Fourth Amendment to the United states constitution cannot be
supported."79 Again the dissent criticized the majority for
abdicating its obligation to independently interpret and give effect
to its bill of rights.80
The seminal case on the issue of whether Illinois courts would
be in lockstep with the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was People v. Tisler.81 The
issue in Tisler was whether as a matter of state constitutional law,
Illinois should reject the United States Supreme Court's newly
minted test for probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. 82
Resolving the issue squarely implicated whether Article I Section 6
offered the same protections as the Fourth Amendment, and if so,
whether Illinois courts should be in lockstep with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.83
In resolving the issue, the Tisler court focused on the intent of
the framers of the 1970 Illinois constitutional convention.84 The
court found that "the convention manifested no intent to expand the
nature of the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment." 85
Thus, despite expanding the protections of Article I Section 6 to
include a right to privacy, and right to be free from eavesdropping,
this did not necessarily expand the search and seizure clause of
Article I Section 6.86 Further, the court found that prior cases on
search and seizure had indicated that the Illinois search and seizure
clause is measured by the same standards used in defining the

78. People v. Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d 941, 945 (Ill. 1984).
79. Id.; See also Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26 (noting history of lockstep).
80. Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d at 954 (Simon, J., dissenting) ("[Illinois is not] bound to
follow automatically the decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting
the comparable provision contained in the Fourth Amendment.").
81. Tisler, 469 N.E.3d. 147.
82. Id.; compare, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (rejecting the AgularSpinelli Standard as basis for determining probable cause replacing it with the
totality of circumstance test for probable cause thereby finding sufficient evidence to
support a search warrant where police acted on an anonymous tip with corroborating
circumstances), with People v. Gates, 423 N.E.2d 887 (Ill. 1981) (determining that
under the Agular-Spinelli standard for determining probable cause, an anonymous
letter sent to police department detailing proposed drug activities with corroborating
evidence was insufficient to support a search warrant).
83. Tisler, 469 N.E.3d. 117.
84. Id.
85. Id. (the court was referring to the 1970 constitutional convention committee
reports).
86. See Ill. Const. art. I, § 6 (1970) (adding new substantive rights); see also, Ill.
Const. art. II, §6 (1870).
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protections against unreasonable searches and seizures contained
in the Fourth Amendment.87
The majority in Tisler proceeded to announce the following test
for when it would depart from the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment:
When the language within our state and federal constitutions is
nearly identical, departure from the United States Supreme Court's
construction of the provision will generally be warranted only if we
find in the language of our constitution, or in the debates and the
committee reports of the constitutional convention, something which
will indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be
construed differently than are similar provisions in the federal
Constitution, after which they are patterned.88

Despite the announcement of the new test for departing from
lockstep, the dissent and concurrence contended that the United
States Supreme Court's decisions should be guides and not
mandatory.89 The dissent declared the lockstep doctrine dangerous,
stating in effect that it is a self-imposed rule by the courts on
interpreting their own constitution that restricts potential
constitutional protections because the court essentially truncates
its analysis.90
Following Tisler, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that the
lockstep doctrine was not quite settled, with one justice even
claiming: "it appears that the lockstep doctrine is on its last leg." 91
In some cases that followed Tisler, the court reiterated its intent to
not depart from the lockstep approach, stating in effect that Article
I Section 6 provided the same level of protection as the Fourth
Amendment.92 However, other cases either provided exceptions to
the lockstep doctrine, or seemingly did not follow it.93

87. See Tisler, 469 N.E.3d. at 156; But see Leven, supra note 70 (regarding cases
of lockstep where Illinois diverged).
88. See Tisler, 469 N.E.3d. at 156 (announcing the test for departing in
interpretation of Article I Section 6 from the Fourth Amendment).
89. Id. at 161 (Ward J., concurring). Justice Ward stated, "a court, in interpreting
a constitution, is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers of it and the
citizens who have adopted it" and " this is the polestar of [constitutional]
construction, all other principles of construction are only rule or guides to aid in the
determination of intention of the constitution's framers." Id. (Ward, J., concurring).
Furthermore, Justice Ward stated article I section 6 is not more expansive than the
fourth amendment: “it is interesting to note that the delegates did expand the searchand-seizure provisions in the proposed constitution to include a guarantee of free
from unreasonable eavesdropping and invasions of privacy." Id.
90. Id. at 166 (Goldenhersh J., dissenting).
91. People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ill. 1988) (Clark J.,
Concurring).
92. See Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 26. See, e.g., People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462 (2002);
People v. Lampitok 207 Ill. 2d 231 (2003).
93. See People v. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604 (1996) (declining to follow the United
States Supreme court decision in Krull, primarily based on United States Supreme
Court Justice O'Connor's dissent in Krull which highlighted the flaws in the
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Finally, in 2006, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed in
People v. Caballes that it would continue to adhere to the lockstep
doctrine and employ the test set out in Tisler.94 However, in
Caballes, the court conceded that it was not in "strict lockstep" with
the United States Supreme Court. 95 The court in Caballes instead
stated that Illinois operates under what they declared a "limited
lockstep approach."96
Under the "limited lockstep approach," Illinois courts will
"assume the dominance of federal law and focus on the gap-filling
potential of the state constitution."97 In effect, this approach first
looks at the federal constitution, and if the federal constitution
provides no relief, then it turns to the state constitution.98 In doing
so, the court will determine whether a unique state history or state
experience justifies departure from federal precedent.99 In
departing from lockstep, the court will consider both "state
tradition" and "state values."100 This potentially can include: a
flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and
federal government, or distinctive state characteristics. 101
As a practical matter, in the realm of Article I Section 6,
litigants must argue to the court that there was some intention by
the framers of the 1970 Illinois constitution to depart in some way,
from Fourth Amendment interpretation by the United States
Supreme Court.102 In addition, departure can also be justified by
some state tradition or state value that would allow Illinois courts
to act outside of the lockstep doctrine. 103 Thus, departure from
lockstep will have to pass the test set out in Tisler and reaffirmed
in Caballes.104
reasoning of the majority's opinion in Krull); see also Krull, 480 U.S. at 349.
94. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26; See also Tisler, 469 N.E.3d. at 156 (stating the test
for departure from the "lockstep doctrine" in Illinois).
95. Id.
96. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 42-3. The Court's "limited lockstep" approach falls
somewhere between strict lockstep and the interstitial approach. See id.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Leven, supra note 70, at 115 (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court
has a long-standing tradition of providing broader constitutional protection than the
U.S. Supreme Court).
102. See generally Tisler, 469 N.E.3d. at 157 (setting out the test for departing
from lockstep with the United States Supreme Court's decision interpreting the
Fourth Amendment). An example of the framers of the constitution intent to depart
might be the addition of two new substantive rights. See Ill. Const. Art. I §6 (1970).
Another example that could justify departure is a state value. See Leven, supra note
70.
103. See Leven, supra note 70, at 115.
104. See Tisler, 469 N.E.3d. at 157 (setting out the test for departing from
interpreting the state and federal constitutions in lockstep); See also Caballes, 851
N.E 2d 26 (reaffirming the test for departure from lockstep set out in Tisler and
describing Illinois' version of Lockstep and "limited lockstep" as opposed to strict
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D. Emergence of the Exclusionary Rule as the Remedy
for Unlawful Searches and Seizures at Both the
Federal and Illinois Level
The foregoing has discussed Illinois' courts approach to
interpreting Article I Section 6 with respect to the Fourth
Amendment: when the United States Supreme Court finds that
certain government conduct constitutes a search or a seizure for
Fourth Amendment purposes, Illinois courts will hold that same
conduct also violates Article I Section 6. 105 However, whether
exclusion of evidence is warranted for this constitutional violation
is a separate question not specifically found in the language of
either the Fourth Amendment or Article I Section 6. 106 The
exclusionary rule analysis emerged in American court's
jurisprudence roughly 100 years ago.
1. Mechanics of a Fourth Amendment Analysis
Before discussing the emergence of the exclusionary rule, it is
worth briefly discussing how state and federal courts analyze a
potential Fourth Amendment violation. The Fourth Amendment
protects against two types of government activity: Searches and
seizures.107 In general, a search is defined as an impingement on
one's reasonable expectation of privacy.108 A seizure can take two
forms: (1) a seizure of a person such as an arrest or (2) a seizure of
someone's possessions.109 A seizure of an individual is defined as a
reasonable belief that a person does not feel they have the right to
leave.110 Similarly, a seizure of an individual's possessions is defined
lockstep, thereby leaving room for departure from federal precedent).
105. See generally Caballes, 851 N.E.2d at 26 (re-affirming Illinois' adherence to
lockstep).
106. See U.S. U.S. CONST. IV (nothing mandating exclusion of illegally seized
evidence); see also Ill. Const. art. I, § 6 (1970) (nothing mandating exclusion of
illegally seized evidence).
107. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (holding that the trespass doctrine is no longer the
only controlling test to determine a search, and adopting the reasonable expectation
of privacy test, and finding that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not
places); see also United States v. Jones, 560 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding that the basic
trespassory search test was still applicable in light of Katz so that government
trespasses on a protected area that constitutes a search)
108. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347.; See also Jones, 560 U.S. at 404 (concluding that in
light of the historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment that the text of the
Fourth Amendment reflects a close connection to property and fourth amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass). A search has also been defined as
a physical or trespassory intrusion on a person’s property by the government. Id.
109. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (stating that the text of
the Fourth Amendment protects two types of expectations one involving searches
and the other seizures).
110. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (concluding that a person
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as a meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interest in that property.111 Accordingly, the threshold question to
any Fourth Amendment analysis is to show that there has either
been a search or seizure of some sort by the government. 112
Showing a governmental search or seizure is only the first step
in the analysis. In order for there to be an unconstitutional search
or seizure, the second prong, and ultimate touchstone of the
analysis, requires the search or seizure to be unreasonable. 113 The
reasonableness requirement generally means that the police must
obtain a search warrant, based on probable cause, that there is
evidence of a crime in the place they seek to search.114 However,
there are many exceptions to the warrant requirement. 115 Similarly,
if police wish to make an arrest (seizure of person) or seizure of

has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all
the circumstances surround the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave). Examples of circumstances that might indicate a
seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave would be: (1) threatening
presence of multiple officers; (2) the display of a weapon by an officer; (3) some
physical touching of the person; (4) the use of language or tone of voice indicating
that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. Id.; see, e.g., Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (suspect was seized when the officer conducted a pat down for
weapons).
111. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (defining what constitutes a seizure of effects in
general). Further, the court has held that seizure of personal property is generally
per se unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth Amendment unless it is
pursuant to a judicial warrant based upon probable cause and meets the
particularity requirement of the fourth amendment. See United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that the police can justifiably conduct a limited seizure of
effects without searching it but because the detention was 90 minutes long this
exceeded the limited scope of the seizure making it unreasonable under the fourth
amendment). However, there are certain limited exceptions such as exigent
circumstances or the probable cause exception to terry stops of the person that are
also applicable to effects. See id. at 702-3.
112. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S at 113 (stating that the text of the fourth amendment
protects two types of expectations from an individual: one involving searches and one
involving seizures).
113. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 389, 403 (2006); see also
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (observing that the touchstone of
Fourth Amendment analysis is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances
regarding the alleged search or search which constituted the alleged violation). The
Fourth Amendment only protects against unreasonable search and seizures. See id.
114. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (police may not conduct a search
unless they first convince a neutral and detached magistrate that there is probable
cause to do so); but see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (noting that it is
well-settled that seizure of property or even a person in a public space where there
is sufficient evidence to connect the person or property to the crime does not require
a warrant due to the lack of expectation of privacy and exigency)
115. See, e.g, Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 (noting the exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment). One exception to the warrant requirement
is if police witness the crime allegedly committed. If this happens, they can make an
arrest without a warrant. See generally id.
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property, they likewise must obtain an arrest warrant, based on
probable cause, that the suspect committed the crime.116
2. Emergence and Development of the Federal Exclusionary
Rule as the Remedy for Fourth Amendment Violations
Until 1914, there was no rule mandating that evidence must
be excluded at trial due to a Fourth Amendment violation.117 At the
federal level, the exclusionary rule emerged in Weeks v. United
States.118 The issue in Weeks was whether evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment could be used against the
defendant at trial.119 The majority stated that the effect of the
Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and
federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under
certain limitations and restraints in the exercise of their power and
authority.120 In doing so, “the courts will forever secure the people,
their persons, their houses and their papers and effects against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law.” 121
After discussing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the
Weeks court declared the remedy for a violation thereof, and the
rationale for the remedy.122 Simply put, the remedy is to exclude the
unlawfully seized evidence from the prosecutor’s case. 123 The Court
reasoned that allowing the unlawfully seized evidence against the
accused at trial, would effectively render the Fourth Amendment "of
no value…[and thus] might as well be stricken from the
constitution."124 The Court focused on giving life to the words of the
116. California v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (stating that an arrest is
the quintessential seizure of person which is certainly accomplished by a physical
touching but is not necessarily the only way to seize a person).
117. See Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 (holding the federal exclusionary rule applies to
federal prosecutions); See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 32 (1949) (holding that
the federal exclusionary rule is not mandated in state prosecutions); See also U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
118. Weeks, 232 U.S 383.
119. See id. In Weeks, the defendant was arrested without a search warrant and
the officers took possession of his papers and other possessions from to be used
against him at trial. See generally id. (giving a background of the circumstances of
the case and holding that the evidence must be excluded due to the constitutional
violation).
120. Id.
121. Id., at 392 (the court stated that to find otherwise would be destructive of
the rights secured by the federal constitution and the courts should not sanction a
contrary practice in their duty to uphold the Constitution.).
122. Id.; but see Wolf, 338 U.S. at 32 (holding that unlawfully seized evidence can
be used in state prosecutions despite that same evidence being inadmissible in
federal prosecutions).
123. See Weeks, 232 U.S. 383.
124. Id. (stating “conviction by unlawful seizure…should find no sanction in the
judgment of the courts, which are charged at all time with the support of the
Constitution, and which people of all conditions have right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.”).
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Fourth Amendment and making sure the Court maintained its
integrity by not allowing illegally seized evidence in at trial.125
However, Weeks only applied to federal courts until 1961 when
Mapp v. Ohio selectively incorporated126 the protections afforded by
the Fourth Amendment to all the states by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause.127 Accordingly, a Fourth
Amendment violation by a state actor could trigger the federal
exclusionary rule in a state criminal trial to suppress the illegally
seized evidence.128 Effectively, state constitutional provisions like
Article I section 6 of the Illinois Constitution ceased to be the sole
protections from unlawful searches and seizures. 129 Nevertheless,
state courts were still free to find that exclusion was warranted
based on their state constitutional provision protecting against
illegal searches and seizures.130
Importantly, Mapp's holding reiterated the rationale for
applying exclusionary rule first discussed at the federal level in
Weeks.131 In short, Mapp held that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule was to (1) compel respect for the Fourth Amendment by state
actors and (2) acknowledge the imperative of judicial integrity in
administering justice.132 The court stated "[i]f the criminal goes free,
it is the law that sets him free because the government cannot ‘fail
to observe its own laws.’"133 It was apparent that the general
125. See generally id.
126. Selective incorporation is the idea that the constitutional rights set forth in
the bill of rights are made applicable to the states over time by court decisions. See
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (discussing selective
incorporation theory and total incorporation theory).
127. See Mapp, 367 U.S at 658 (noting that the exclusionary rule is an essential
part of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment). Accordingly, the Fourth
Amendment protections are applied to state actors in addition to federal actors. Id.
128. See id.
129. Compare Wolf, 338 U.S. 25 (holding that in a prosecution is a state court for
a state crime the fourteenth amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure), with Ill. Const. art. II, § 6 (1870)
(the relevant search and seizure clause which was relied on for the Illinois courts
holding in Brocamp).
130. See O'Neill, supra note 66, at 333 (noting that the dual sovereignty found in
our federal system provides state courts with the freedom to resolve issues based on
state constitutional provisions); See also Mapp 367 U.S. 643 (making the Fourth
Amendment applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment). Further, since
the Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the states, it effectively became
another source of protection. See id.
131. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (holding in part that the remedy for Fourth
Amendment violation is to exclude the illegally seized evidence because "to hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment.").
132. Id. This removed the incentive by police to disregard the Fourth
Amendment. Id. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged it would not condone using
illegal evidence to convict someone. Id.
133. See id. at 659 (quoting Justice Brandeis) ("[o]ur government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
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purpose of applying the exclusionary rule was to maintain the
integrity of the judiciary, and at the same time, compel respect for
the Fourth Amendment by removing any incentive to disregard it. 134
It was equally apparent that the federal exclusionary rule was an
"essential part" of the Fourth Amendment, otherwise it could not be
a constitutional mandate by which the states were bound.135
a. Unprecedented Introduction of the Cost-Benefit Analysis
for Determining Applicability of the Federal
Exclusionary Rule
Despite the holding in Weeks and broad dicta in Mapp, the
Burger Court began to slowly erode the applicability of the federal
exclusionary rule.136 In a line of cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court starting in the early 1970’s, the Supreme Court
chipped away at Mapp's holding. In doing so, the Court laid the
jurisprudential basis for the "good-faith exception" to the federal
exclusionary rule.137
In United States v. Calandra, the Court de-constitutionalized
the federal exclusionary rule.138 The court accomplished this by
stating that the principal, “if not the sole” objective of the
exclusionary rule, is to deter future unlawful police conduct. 139
Instead of applying the federal exclusionary rule primarily for the
purpose of remedying a Fourth Amendment violation, the rule was
to be applied to deter future unlawful police conduct.140 Accordingly,
the Court went on to hold that a witness called to testify before a
grand jury may not refuse to testify on grounds that the questions
are based on illegally seized evidence, since this would not
accomplish deterrence.141
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. Nor can it lightly
be assumed that, as a practical matter, adoption of the exclusionary rule fetters law
enforcement. Only last year this Court expressly considered that contention and
found that ‘pragmatic evidence of a sort’ to the contrary was not wanting.").
134. See id. (acknowledging the Supreme Court would not condone using illegal
evidence to convict someone).
135. Id.
136. See O'Neill, supra note 10 ("beginning in 1969, the Burger court began
limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule.").
137. See generally Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (the good-faith exception is generally an
exception to the exclusionary rule whereby a court finds that a police officer or other
government agent or official, despite violating the Fourth Amendment, acted in goodfaith and thus the exclusionary rule does not apply).
138. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).; See generally, Thomas K.
Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right, 10
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 357 (2013) (making the point that the Fourth Amendment is
constitutionally based as a right and not merely a remedy).
139. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 931 (Brennan J., dissenting) (noting that the idea that
the exclusionary rule is merely a remedy was first brought up in Wolf, 338 U.S. 25).
140. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338.
141. See generally Calandra, 414 U.S. 338; See also LaFave, supra note 3 (noting
purposes of the exclusionary rule).
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In reaching its holding, the Court introduced the notion of a
“balancing test,” never mentioned in Mapp, or any case before, for
determining the applicability of the federal exclusionary rule.142
The specific balancing test in Calandra involved weighing "the
potential injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury
against the potential deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule as
applied in this context."143 Specifically, the cost-benefit analysis
weighed whether there were sufficient deterrence effects on police
that would result from excluding evidence from a grand jury. 144 In
turn, this dictated whether applying the exclusionary rule was
warranted.145 The Court held there were not sufficient deterrence
benefits.146
Calandra dealt with application of the federal exclusionary
rule prior to the start of a criminal trial.147 Nevertheless, it laid the
foundation for thinking of the exclusionary rule in terms of a costbenefit analysis. Importantly, the introduction of the cost-benefit
analysis in Calandra meant that the application of the exclusionary
rule (i.e. excluding unlawfully seized evidence from the from
prosecutors use against the defendant) itself was not sufficient to
accomplish deterrence.148 Rather, whether the exclusionary rule
should be applied was conditioned upon whether the Court
determined the deterrence benefits from applying the rule
outweighed the costs.149 Thus, the introduction of cost-benefits
analysis made application of the exclusionary rule inherently more
malleable.150 Furthermore, the cases that followed only solidified
the Court's reasoning in Calandra, and propounded police
deterrence as the primary purpose of the applying the exclusionary
rule.151
142. See Bloom, supra note 20 (giving a background on the cost/benefit analysis
employed by the court starting in the 1970s).
143. Calandra, 414 U.S. at. 349. The issue in Calandra was whether a witness
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may refuse to answer questions
on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and
seizure. Id. The Court found that it is unrealistic to assume that application of the
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would further the goal of deterrence. Id.
144. See generally Calandra, 414 U.S. 338.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id.; The holding in Mapp suggested that applying the exclusionary rule
for a Fourth Amendment violation was also sufficient to accomplish deterrence. See
Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (discussing that the exclusionary rule required to command
respect for constitution).
149. See generally Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
150. See Bloom, supra note 20, at 26.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that
exclusionary rule in federal civil proceedings, where the United States is a party, has
no applicability since the deterrence benefits of applying the rule would be marginal
and not outweigh the costs); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (relying on the
Calandra balancing test and holding that deterrence was the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule and therefore where the state has provided an opportunity for a
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b. Leon's Application of the Cost-Benefit Analysis to the
Criminal Trial
Despite the Calandra the line of cases, until 1984, the federal
exclusionary rule undoubtedly applied to a defendant being
criminally prosecuted, if the defendant made a showing that police
conducted an unreasonable search or seizure. 152 However, in 1984
the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Leon.153
This case added a third prong to the analysis: even if there was a
search or a seizure, and it was found to be unreasonable, if the state
could make a showing that the police officers acted in "good-faith"
on a facially valid warrant, the evidence would not be excluded. 154
Effectively, this prevented the federal exclusionary rule from
applying despite there being a Fourth Amendment violation. 155 As
a result, the unlawfully seized evidence could be admitted at a
criminal trial, and used to convict the defendant.
Leon made the categorical shift of applying the cost-benefit
analysis to the criminal trial in order to determine whether the
federal exclusionary rule was applicable. 156 In Leon, there was a
facially valid search warrant issued by a state court judge, which
lead to a search that produced a large amount of drugs. 157 The
evidence was ultimately suppressed by the trial court based on a
lack of probable cause contained in the affidavit for search warrant.

full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be
granted federal Habeas Corpus relief even on the grounds that evidence was obtained
during an unconstitutional search or seizure); compare Janis, 428 U.S. 433, and
Powell, 428 U.S. 485, with United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (making a
categorical shift in the use of illegally seized evidence in holding that illegally seized
evidence can be used by the government at a criminal trial for impeachment purposes
despite it not being allowed in the government's case-in- chief) and Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431 (1984) (adopting the inevitable discovery exception to the federal
exclusionary rule thereby allowing illegally seized evidence in the state's case-inchief if the court found that the police would have inevitably discovered it despite the
unconstitutional search since the deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule
was marginal).
152. See Weeks, 232 U.S. 383; See also Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (adopting the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule); but see generally Havens, supra note 151
(allowing illegally seized evidence in at trial to impeach defendant's testimony).
However, it is important to note that this case didn’t allow this exception until 1980.
See id.
153. Leon, 468 U.S. 897.
154. See id. However, under Mapp, evidence seized pursuant to a facially valid
warrant, later declared invalid, would trigger the federal exclusionary rule and
suppress the illegally seized evidence. See generally Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
155. See id.
156. See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. 338; Williams, 467 U.S. 431; see also Leon, 468
U.S. at 902 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding, for the first time, that unlawfully seized
evidence can be used to convict)
157. Leon, 468 U.S. at 902.
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The appellate court affirmed.158 The critical issue raised on appeal
was whether the federal exclusionary rule should apply when
evidence is seized by police acting in reasonable, good-faith reliance,
on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be invalid. 159
Justice White, writing for the majority stated the exclusionary
rule was neither "a necessary corollary of the Fourth amendment"
nor "required by the conjunction of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments."160 "The Fourth Amendment contains no provision
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands…."161 Furthermore, the Court found that the use of the
fruits of an illegal search or seizure works no new Fourth
Amendment wrong.162 Instead, the judicially created exclusionary
rule is intended not to cure the invasions of defendant’s rights, but
rather, it operates so as to produce a deterrent effect from future
violations.163
From these premises, the Court looked to prior decisions
regarding application of the exclusionary rule. The Court found that
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in a criminal trial
still requires weighing the costs of applying the rule to society,
against the benefits of applying the rule in terms of deterring police
from future constitutional violations. 164 The Court found that
sacrificing reliable and relevant evidence produces substantial
costs.165 Further, the Court found the benefits of applying the rule
would be marginal, since judges and magistrates cannot be deterred
from committing Fourth Amendment violations. 166 The Court
concluded that the proper scope for measuring potential deterrent
benefits is limited to police officers.167 Since the police officers in
Leon could not be expected to challenge a facially valid warrant, the
Court concluded that police officers behavior could not be altered in
some meaningful way by applying the exclusionary rule. 168 As a
result, there would be little to no deterrence benefit, and applying
the rule was unwarranted.

158. Id.
159. Id. at 905
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. 338); but see Leon, 468 U.S. at 932 (Brennan
J., dissenting) (stating that since seizures are executed to secure evidence, and
evidence has utility in legal system only in the context of supervised trial, the
admission of illegally obtained evidence implicates the same constitutional concerns
as the initial seizure of that evidence because the judiciary becomes part of what is
in fact a single governmental action).
163. Leon, 468 U.S. at 902.
164. Id.; see, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. 338; Janis, 428 U.S. 433.
165. Leon, 468 U.S. at 902
166. But see Leon, 468 U.S. at 932 (Brennan J., dissenting) (by admitting judges
do in fact violate the Fourth Amendment since the Constitution applies to them).
167. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
168. Id.
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3. Emergence of the State Exclusionary Rule as the Remedy
for Article I Section 6 Violations
The foregoing discussed the application of the federal
exclusionary rule based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Illinois has a distinct exclusionary rule protecting the provisions of
Article I section 6.169 At the Illinois level, the exclusionary rule
emerged in 1923 when the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v.
Brocamp.170 The facts of Brocamp were similar to that in Weeks.171
The issue at bar in Brocamp was whether the evidence obtained by
police, which violated not only the Fourth Amendment, but also
Article II Section 6 of the 1870 Illinois constitution, was required to
be excluded at trial from prosecutor's case.172
In reaching its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
it was the constitutional right of Illinois residents to be protected
against unlawful searches and seizures. 173 Anything to the contrary
would have the effect of declaring the constitutional guarantees "a
mere nullity and our boasted rights of liberty…vain." 174 After
making this finding the court stated that the guarantees afforded
to the criminal defendant must, by necessity, have a remedy if they
are violated.175 Thus, the court held that the remedy for an unlawful
search and seizure is exclusion of that evidence from trial. Most
importantly, the Brocamp court based its decision on independent
state constitutional grounds.176 The court stated: “violation of our
search and seizure clause requires exclusion.” 177 The reason was
clear: “anything to the contrary would render [Illinois']
constitutional guarantees a mere nullity.”178
Illinois via Brocamp and the United States via Weeks adopted
their respective exclusionary rules as the mechanism for enforcing
Article I Section 6179 and the Fourth Amendment.180 From these two

169. See Brocamp, 138 N.E. at 731 (creating state exclusionary rule remedy)
170. Id.
171. Id. In this case officers were investigating a burglary and found their way
to defendant’s house. See id. They searched through the defendant’s premises and
seized multiple items that they identified as stolen property without a warrant. Id.
The court described this case as a clear constitutional violation. See id., at 456
(finding that the exclusion of evidence at trial was warranted given the
circumstances); see also Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 (dealing with a similar factual
background that led to the federal exclusionary rule).
172. See Ill. Const. art. I, § 6 (1970) (search and seizure provision that was
formerly contained in Ill. Const. art. II, § 6 (1870)).
173. Brocamp, 138 N.E. at 731.
174. Id.
175. Accord, Ill. Const. art. I, §12 (1970); Cf. Ill. Const. art. II, §19 (1870).
176. See Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728.
177. See id.; see also Ill. Const. art. II, § 6 (1870) (state constitutional search and
seizure clause).
178. Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728.
179. See Ill. Const. art. I. § 6, (1970) (formerly Ill. Const. art. II, § 6 (1870)).
180. See generally Weeks, 232 U.S. 383; See also Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728 at 732
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cases, the legal justification for applying the rule was very similar:
so the respective constitutional provisions would not be merely a
form of words.181 Nevertheless, Illinois and the United States each
have a distinct constitutional basis for reaching the decision that
the exclusionary rule is applicable to the search and seizure
provisions of their respective constitutions. 182

III. ANALYSIS
A.

Illinois' "Limited Lockstep Doctrine" Applied
to Illinois' State Exclusionary Rule
and the Issue It Presents

The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that It adheres to the
“limited lockstep doctrine” when interpreting the search and seizure
provision contained in Article I Section 6. 183 The "limited lockstep
doctrine" will provide the answer to the question, for example, of
what constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure under Article I
Section 6.184 When the United States Supreme Court holds that
certain conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, Illinois courts will
hold that same conduct also violates Article I Section 6. 185
However, the issue this presents is whether Illinois' "limited
lockstep doctrine" also controls whether the state exclusionary rule
must be applied in accordance with the United State Supreme
Court's application of the federal exclusionary rule? 186 According to
Caballes, the answer hinges on whether application of the state
exclusionary rule falls within a recognized exception to the "limited
lockstep doctrine."187 If it does, this would allow Illinois courts to
(stating that it is the duty of the court to exclude the evidence gathered in violation
of the state constitution).
181. See id. (giving rise to state exclusionary rule); see also Weeks, 232 U.S. 383
(giving rise to federal exclusionary rule).
182. Compare Weeks (basing the decision to exclude illegally seized evidence on
the dictates of the Fourth Amendment), with Brocamp (basing the decision to exclude
illegally seized evidence on the dictates of the search and seizure provision of the
state constitution). Each exclusionary rule has a distinct constitutional basis. See id.;
Compare Ill. Const. art. II, § 6 (1870) (basis for Brocamp holding), with Ill. Const.
art. I, § 6 (1970) (adding new substantive provisions).
183. See Caballes, 221 N.E. 2d. 26 (affirming the continued adherence to the
lockstep doctrine in Illinois).
184. See generally id. (when the United States Supreme Court holds certain
conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, that same conduct will violate Article I
section 6).
185. But, see id. (litigants can make the argument that Article I Section 6 was
intended to be construed more broadly by the framers of the 1970 constitution).
186. See id. (holding that Illinois would continue to adhere to the "limited
lockstep doctrine" in interpreting and applying Ill. Const. art. I, § 6).
187. See Caballes, 221 N.E.2d at 44 (finding additional criteria for departure
from lockstep includes state tradition and preexisting state law). The framers intent,
or state value or tradition are examples. Id.; see also, Leven, supra note 70.
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freely apply the state exclusionary rule without reference to the
United States Supreme Court's application of the federal
exclusionary rule.
In Caballes, the court stated that if there was a long-standing
state tradition reflected in case law, departure from lockstep would
be justified.188 This leniency is precisely why Illinois is considered a
"limited lockstep" state rather than a "strict lockstep" state.189 In
the realm of the state exclusionary rule, Illinois has a long-standing
state tradition dating back to Brocamp, and reaffirmed in
subsequent cases prior to the emergence of the "limited lockstep
doctrine" set out in Tisler, of applying the state exclusionary rule as
a remedy for Article I Section 6 violations. 190 Importantly, the
Illinois Supreme Court decided in Brocamp that exclusion was
necessary for Article I Section 6 violations long before the Fourth
Amendment was made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
amendment, making it possible for Illinois courts to apply the
federal exclusionary rule.191 This demonstrates that the Illinois
Supreme Court construed the Illinois constitution as providing
Illinois residents with protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures well before Mapp made the Fourth Amendment
applicable to the states to provide that same protection.192 Brocamp
also demonstrates that the exclusionary rule arising out of Article I
Section 6 is the appropriate state remedy for a violation of this
Illinois constitutional provision.193
Further support for application of the state exclusionary rule
as constituting a "state tradition" is found post adoption of the
"limited lockstep doctrine."194 For instance, in People v. Kreugar, the
Illinois Supreme Court applied the state exclusionary rule in order
to protect the provisions of Article I Section 6, despite the fact that
the United States Supreme Court found the federal exclusionary
rule inapplicable for same constitutional violation. 195

188. See Caballes, 221 N.E.2d. 26.
189. See id. (noting that Illinois is not in strict lockstep with the decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court on the same or similar issues).
190. See generally Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728 (applying exclusionary rule based on
Illinois constitution Article II, § 6); See also City of Chicago v. Lord, 130 N.E. 2d 504,
505 (Ill. 1955) (applying state exclusionary rule based on Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728).
191. Compare Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728 (creating the state exclusionary rule and
applying it to violations of Illinois state search and seizure clause contained in Ill.
Const. art. II, § 6 (1870)), with Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (holding that the federal
exclusionary rule based on the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment).
192. See Leven, supra note 70, at 77 (stating the Illinois Supreme Court provided
broader constitutional protection based on Illinois' Constitution long before the U.S.
Supreme Court extended analogous protections found in the U.S. Constitution to the
states.).
193. Id.
194. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604.
195. Id.
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If Illinois courts are free to apply the state exclusionary rule
when they determine that the federal exclusionary rule does not
protect the provisions of Article I Section 6 sufficiently, the next
issue presented is whether Illinois Court's should apply the state
exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment (and thus Article I Section
6) violations? Since Mapp made the federal exclusionary rule
applicable to the states, Illinois courts can either apply the federal
exclusionary rule or the state exclusionary rule for Fourth
Amendment violations.196 Effectively, they both exclude the
unlawfully seized evidence. The difference is in the scope of their
application. This is relevant because in recent years the United
States Supreme Court has limited the applicability of the federal
exclusionary rule.
The Supreme Court has limited the application of the federal
exclusionary rule by using the cost-benefit analysis in determining
whether to exclude the unlawfully seized evidence. In turn, the use
of the cost-benefit analysis has led to an extension of the good-faith
exception. The result is that more Fourth Amendment violations
occur without proper remedy.197
Another factor that makes this question relevant is that if
Illinois courts specifically apply the state exclusionary rule, they are
not bound by the analytical framework the United States Supreme
Court applies when determining whether to apply the federal
exclusionary rule.198 The following will explore the applicability of
the federal exclusionary rule. The focus will be on the courts use of
the cost-benefit analysis and the problems with this framework.
Then the applicability of the state exclusionary rule will be
discussed and compared with that of the federal exclusionary rule.

B.

Initial Problem with Leon's Introduction of the CostBenefit Analysis to the Criminal Trial

The United States Supreme Court in Leon introduced the costbenefit analysis to determine whether to apply the federal
exclusionary rule in the criminal trial setting. However, the Court
never addressed a fundamental presumption in their opinion: that
196. Compare Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (holding federal exclusionary rule is applicable
to the states), with Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728 (creating exclusionary rule arising out of
Article I section 6).
197. Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule,
99 GEO. L.J. 1077 (2011) (stating that no other remedy is available to correct Fourth
Amendment constitutional violations like the exclusionary rule); see, e.g., Davis v.
United States, 546 U.S. 229,131 (2011) (holding that searches conducted in
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject the
federal exclusionary rule); see generally LaFave, supra note 3 (criticizing the costbenefit test as an unworkable).
198. See generally O'Neill, supra note 11 (stating that if Illinois courts
specifically decide a case on state constitutional grounds, the decision is shielded
from U.S. Supreme Court review).
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the exclusionary rule is merely a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard the Fourth Amendment through its deterrent effect. 199
If the federal exclusionary rule is inapplicable sometimes
because the deterrence benefits do not outweigh the societal costs of
applying the rule, then it seems less like a constitutional
command.200 This is problematic because of the Court's holding in
Mapp, where the federal exclusionary rule was deemed part and
parcel of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. 201 That is
precisely the reason that the states were required to follow the
decision in Mapp, which held that the federal exclusionary rule was
constitutionally mandated by the Fourth Amendment through the
Fourteenth Amendment.202 If the federal exclusionary rule was not
an essential part of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, then
the states would not be bound to follow it. 203 However, Mapp clearly
held that the states must apply the federal exclusionary rule when
there is a Fourth Amendment violation. 204
Leon's introduction of the cost-benefit analysis is also
problematic because it is incongruous with other types of
evidentiary exclusionary rules. 205 For instance, evidentiary
privileges found in the federal rules of evidence at the time Leon
was decided, required federal courts to exclude many categories of
highly relevant and reliable evidence.206 These categories of
evidence have been deemed to protect societal values and promote
certain societal goals.207 Importantly, these rule do not require a

199. See LaFave, supra note 3, § 1.3.
200. Id.
201. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656; see also LaFave, supra note 3, §1.3.
202. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 932 (Brennan J., dissenting); see also LaFave, supra
note 3, § 1.3(b).
203. Compare Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (finding due process requires unlawfully
seized evidence excluded in state prosecutions) with Wolf, 338 U.S. 25 (holding due
process does not require evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
exclude from state prosecutions). If due process would not be violated when states
admitted unlawfully seized evidence, the exclusionary rule would not be considered
a fundamental right that due process would require the states to uphold via the 14th
amendment. See generally Mapp, 387 U.S. 643.; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 913
("Exclusionary rule is not a corollary to the Fourth Amendment.")
204. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 665 ("all evidence obtained by searches in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.").
205. See generally State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting the U.S
Supreme Court's precedent in Leon based on Idaho state constitution). The court in
Guzman also rejected the good-faith exception based on the fact that it would be
inconsistent with Idaho's evidentiary privileges. Id. at 673.
206. See generally FED. R. EVID. 501-02 (effective July 1st, 1975). Such rules
included for instance, attorney-client privilege, doctor-patient privilege, marital
privilege, etc. See id.
207. Id.
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cost-benefit analysis when determining their application. 208 If they
did, it would be practically impossible to so. 209
Illinois Courts have similar evidentiary privileges.210
Accordingly, when Illinois courts apply the federal exclusionary
rule, similar concerns are raised with respect to Illinois' evidentiary
privileges.211 The main point is that if (1) the federal exclusionary
rule protects the values embodied in the Fourth Amendment, and
(2) if Illinois has evidentiary privilege rules, use of a cost-benefit
analysis to determine whether to apply the federal exclusionary
rule is also incongruous for Illinois courts.212 Evidentiary privileges
and the federal exclusionary rule both serve to effectuate important
societal values, that are difficult to quantify, at the cost of reliable
and relevant evidence.213
Despite these problems, Leon made a categorical shift into the
criminal trial context, perhaps an unwarranted one. 214 Prior to
Leon, the cost-benefit analysis was not used in the context of the
criminal trial. Applying the exclusionary rule to exclude the
unlawfully seized evidence was presumed to sufficiently deter
Fourth Amendment violations.215 Therefore, the deterrence benefits
always outweighed the costs in the context of a criminal trial. 216 In
contrast, outside the criminal trial setting, the presumption was
that there was no significant increment of deterrence value if the
Court were to exclude the unlawfully seized evidence. 217

208. See Guzman, 842 P.2d at 673 (finding that it would arguably be impossible
to prove the cost-effectiveness of any given evidentiary privilege).
209. Id.; see generally Guzman, 842 P.2d 660.
210. See RALPH RUEBNER & KATARINA DURCOVA, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE: ILLINOIS
RULES OF EVIDENCE, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTION, A COMPENDIUM FOR CRIMINAL
LITIGATION 112 (2006) (detailing all of evidentiary privileges that Illinois recognizes).
Illinois recognizes many types of evidentiary privileges including: the AttorneyClient privilege; the Marital privilege (725 ILCS 5/115-16); Physician- Patient
Privilege (735 ILCS 5/8-802); Therapist-Patient Privilege (740 ILCS 110/10); Clergy
Privilege (735 ILCS 5/8-803); Informant's Privilege (735 ILCS 5/8-802.3).
Importantly, "Illinois recognizes that certain social and professional relationships
must be protected by the law. Confidential communications between certain persons
must be shielded from disclosure to accomplish [these] societal goals[s]." Id.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., State v. Oaks, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991).
213. See Guzman, 842 P.2d at 673 (finding that "[a]ll of the rules which limit the
admission of relevant evidence, including the exclusionary rule, exist to protect
values which are difficult to quantify, yet which are considered important by
society.").
214. LaFave, supra note 3. The Leon majority argues that they are simply taking
another step comparable to the cases such as Calandra, Powell, or Janis. The court
states, "the balancing approach that has evolved during the years of experience with
the rule provides strong support for the modification currently urged upon us." Leon,
468 U.S. at 913. However, the Leon court did more than simply extend the costbenefit analysis to the criminal trial. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. LaFave, supra note 3. This was arguably a fair assumption. Id.
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However, specifically in the context of a criminal trial, if the
state cannot use the illegally seized evidence, this almost always
makes a conviction harder, if not impossible, to obtain.218 Thus, the
state has an interest in using the illegally obtained evidence to
secure a conviction. Further, there is a direct and foreseeable
consequence of obtaining evidence illegally.219 Specifically, it
predictably will not be admitted.220 If the state knows it cannot use
illegally seized evidence under any circumstance in order to secure
a conviction, this would seem to make application of the
exclusionary rule more significantly more potent than its use
outside of a criminal trial. In turn, this added potency would then
add to the potential deterrence benefits to be yielded from applying
the exclusionary rule in the criminal trial context. 221
Despite these legal problems, the cost-benefit analysis was
applied to the criminal context in Leon. The result: (1) the
exclusionary rule was inapplicable when police officer act pursuant
to a facially valid, but ultimately invalid search warrant and (2) the
"good-faith exception" to the exclusionary rule was born. The
Supreme Court reasoned that there are marginal deterrence
benefits to suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a facially valid,
but ultimately invalid, search warrant.222 Therefore, the Court held
that the exclusionary rule should not be applied. 223
The above detailed some of the legal problems with the costbenefit analysis. However, the cost-benefit analysis is an inherently
empirical test. It involves the court weighing the costs to society of
applying the rule against the potential police deterrence to be
yielded by applying the rule.224 Accordingly, there should be a way
to reliably measure these costs and benefits if the court is to
propound this test as if it were a sound empirical proposition. 225 It
seems however, there is only limited empirical support for the
rule.226
For instance, how does the court measure compliance (i.e. the
deterrence benefits) with the Fourth Amendment if compliance with
the Fourth Amendment produces a non-event?227 In other words,

218. Leon, 468 U.S. at 932 (Brennan J., dissenting). An example would be that if
the state illegally seized drugs, they cannot use those drugs to convict the defendant.
See id. Without the use of drugs, a charge against the defendant could not be
sustained. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See LaFave, supra note 3.
222. Leon, 468 U.S. at 902.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 932 (Brennan J., dissenting)
226. Oakes, 598 A.2d at 126.
227. Id. It produces a non-event, because if there was no Fourth Amendment
violation, the court would not be inquiring into the deterrence value of applying the
rule. See id.
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the cost-benefit analysis attempts to measure the deterrence
benefits when those benefits can only be surmised, for instance, by
whether police actually would have complied with the Fourth
Amendment due to application of the exclusionary rule in a given
situation.228 This lack of certainty seems to make it easier to point
to the cost side of the analysis, since the costs can be more
definitively identified, rather than the benefits, which must be to a
greater extent, surmised. This point is exemplified by the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Krull229 and Arizona
v. Evans.230 These cases demonstrate the Supreme Court's (1)
propensity to overstate the costs using their cost-benefit analysis
and (2) the narrow scope of the analysis. Before discussing Krull
and Evans, consider the following result of applying the cost-benefit
analysis, as illustrated by Leon.
The question before the court is whether to apply the
exclusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search
warrant. The costs of suppressing unlawful evidence obtained in
good-faith pursuant to a facially valid (like Leon), but ultimately
illegal search warrant is that this evidence cannot be used at trial.
A dismissal is therefore much more likely.231 Arguably, this is a
heavier cost when weighed against the deterrence benefit of
suppression here. In principle at least, police can be expected to
unquestionably rely on warrants. 232 Thus, the costs outweigh the
deterrence benefits, with some reasonable certainty, based on
empirical evidence.
However, applying the cost-benefit analysis to extend the goodfaith exception in other contexts cannot be done as accurately or
reliably.233 For instance, in Krull 234 the narrow scope of the costbenefit analysis led to the United States Supreme Court broadening
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The result was
that the federal exclusionary rule is inapplicable to evidence seized
pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. 235 The Court in Krull held
that excluding the evidence gathered pursuant to an
unconstitutional statute would not result in deterrence of
228. Id.
229. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349.
230. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)
231. See generally Davis, 564 U.S. 229 (noting substantial costs of excluding the
relevant and reliable evidence).
232. Leon, 468 U.S. at 902.; but see LaFave, supra note 3, § 1.3(d) (noting that
"under the pre-Leon version of the exclusionary rule police…developed in many
localities the very sound practice of through the warrant-issuing process with the
greatest care, often by having the affidavit reviewed by individuals other than the
magistrate.").
233. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 486 U.S. 981 (1984) (justice Brennan
characterizing the balancing test as follows: assessing the benefits and costs of the
exclusionary rule in various contexts is a virtually impossible task for the judiciary
to perform honestly and accurately).
234. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349.
235. Id.
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constitutional violations by police.236 The court reasoned that the
"exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting
in objectively reasonable reliance on an unconstitutional statute
would have as little deterrent effect on the officer's actions as would
exclusion of evidence when an officer [relies] on an [invalid]
warrant."237 In other words, the Court analogized the situation in
Krull to that in Leon.238
However, the court did not address whether the legislatures
and judges are really analogous in this context. 239 For instance,
there is a cost in allowing legislatures to pass unconstitutional laws
that apply to the defendant, and others who had their Fourth
Amendment rights violated without remedy.240 The cost to the
system is that there are many people living under these
unconstitutional statues having their constitutional rights being
violated "with impunity."241 Moreover, there is an incentive to
promulgate unconstitutional statutes, if those statutes can still be
used as mode for the state to secure convictions. 242 This seems even
more likely when one considers that legislatures are subject to a
great degree of political pressure to pass certain laws. 243
Additionally, under Krull, the defendant has little incentive to
challenge a statute, since he can still be convicted with the evidence
seized, even if the statute that authorized the police act is found
unconstitutional.244 Thus, a criminal defendant is not only left
without a remedy, but there is no real incentive to pursue a remedy
by challenging the statute.245 This can lead to the unconstitutional
statute being in effect longer, obviously affecting more people. These
are all "costs" in the broad sense, but do not factor into the Court's
cost-benefit analysis. Rather, the Court focuses narrowly on the
costs of applying the rule.246

236. Id.
237. Id. Despite the differences between legislators and judicial officers, the court
stated the main purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. Id.
238. See generally id.
239. Krull, 480 U.S. at 355 (O'Connor J., dissenting).
240. See LaFave, supra note 3.
241. Krull, 480 U.S. at 355 (O'Connor J., dissenting)
242. See id. (stating that by making the exclusionary rule inapplicable in these
situations, there is an incentive to pass unconstitutional statutes).
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. See Kerr, supra note 197, at 1096 (stating that civil suit seeking damages,
injunctive relief, declaratory judgment or the possibility of criminal prosecution can
provide the needed deterrent effect that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
provides). These Four alternative remedies cannot correct the constitutional error
that injured the criminal defendant like the exclusionary rule does. Id.
246. See generally Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (where police acted on a stale warrant
issued from courthouse database, the Supreme Court held that applying the
exclusionary rule would have at best a marginal effect on the police officers). The
Court in Evans effectively broadened the good-faith exception using the same costbenefit rationale as the Court in Krull. See id.
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Further, the result in Evans is a good example of the narrow
scope of the potential deterrence benefits of applying the rule. The
Supreme Court in Evans held that court employees cannot be
deterred from committing Fourth Amendment violations. 247 Thus,
when a court employee commits an error in record-keeping that
results in issuance of an invalid arrest warrant, anything seized
pursuant to that invalid arrest is not subject to the federal
exclusionary rule.248 This is true notwithstanding the Court's
assertion that "the exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created
remedy to safeguard against future violation of Fourth Amendment
rights through the rules general deterrent effect."249

C.

The Current Analytical Framework the Roberts
Court Uses for Applying the Federal Exclusionary
Rule and Its Problems

Leon, Krull, and Evans laid the foundation for the Supreme
Court's current approach to applying the federal exclusionary
Rule.250 As discussed above, the cost-benefit analysis used by the
Supreme Court is problematic for several reasons. 251 Nevertheless,
employing the cost-benefit analysis is settled law.252 Thus, Leon,
Krull, and Evans stand for the proposition that (1) the primary
purpose of applying the exclusionary rule to deter police from
committing Fourth Amendment violations; (2) the Supreme Court's
cost-benefit analysis is the only method for determining this; and
(3) judges, legislators and other non-law enforcement agencies or
agents are, by law, not capable of being deterred from committing
Fourth Amendment violations.253
As legal scholar Wayne LaFave notes, arguably the "costbenefit balancing [In Leon, Krull and Evans] was deemed
appropriate because the fact that the person primarily responsible
for the Fourth Amendment violation was not a law enforcement
official."254 This fact "changed the dynamics of the deterrence
analysis" in such a way that the costs, categorically, would outweigh
the deterrence benefits.255 But what about when the cost-benefit
analysis is applied to certain police conduct? This would seem to
change the dynamics of the cost-benefit analysis by adding more

247. See generally Evans, 514 U. S. 1.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 10.
250. Leon, 468 U.S. 897; Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987); Evans, 514 U.S. 1.
251. Leon, 468 U.S. 897; Krull, 480 U.S. 340; Evans, 514 U.S. 1; Oaks, 598 A.2d
119; LaFave, supra note 3; Kerr, supra note 197, at 1096.
252. Davis, 564 U.S. 229.
253. See Part III(B)
254. See LaFave, supra note 3, § 1.6
255. Id.
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weight to potential deterrence benefits of applying the exclusionary
rule.
The cost-benefit analysis prior to Hudson v. Michigan256, was
never applied to action taken exclusively by law enforcement
officials that ended up violating the Fourth Amendment. 257 Hudson
v. Michigan, United States v. Herring and United States v. Davis
together represent the Supreme Court's most current version of the
federal exclusionary rule.258 When read together, these cases
solidify the Supreme Court’s persistent and unreliable use of the
cost-benefit analysis. They also signal a further expansion of the
good-faith exception, which continues to reduce the federal
exclusionary rule to a shell of its former state, pre-Leon.
For Illinois courts, this is problematic. When the United States
Supreme Court expands the good-faith exception to the federal
exclusionary rule, despite the Fourth Amendment (and Article I
Section 6) violation, the violation goes without remedy. If Illinois
applies the federal exclusionary rule, then Article I Section 6 is also
less strictly enforced. In essence then, Illinois courts acquiesce in
two constitutional violations by allowing both to go without remedy:
the Fourth Amendment violation that applies via the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Article I section 6 violation. Further, the
rationale the United States Supreme Court uses when applying the
federal exclusionary rule, in recent years, has become more directly
at odds with the rationale that Illinois courts use when applying the
state exclusionary rule.259
Prior to Hudson v. Michigan, implicit in the police deterrence
rationale propounded by the United States Supreme Court is that
(1) where police do not rely on another authority (i.e. a judge,
legislature, or otherwise) and (2) where police act either
intentionally, recklessly or negligently, in effectuating a search and
seizure, applying the exclusionary rule would yield deterrence
benefits.260 Hudson quashed this presumption.261
The issue in Hudson was whether a violation of the "knock and
announce" requirement by police warranted suppression of the
evidence found subsequent to that violation. 262 Unquestionably,
police acted intentionally, and in violation of this Fourth
Amendment requirement, so the potential deterrent effects to be
yielded were high.263 Nevertheless, the Court held the exclusionary
256. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
257. See LaFave, supra note 3, § 1.6.
258. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Davis, 564 U.S. 229.
259. Compare Herring, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) with Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604; see
also Carrera, 783 N.E.2d 15.
260. See generally Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (legislatures cannot be deterred);
see also Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (court employees cannot be deterred); see also Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (magistrates cannot be deterred).
261. Hudson, 547 U.S. 586.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 590 (stating that the state conceded to a violation of the knock and
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rule was inapplicable.264 The Court stated in support of Its holding
that "ignoring knock- and-announce can realistically be expected to
achieve absolutely nothing except the prevention of destruction of
evidence, and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance by
occupants."265 Accordingly, the Court found the costs of suppressing
the evidence to outweigh any beneficial police deterrence that would
result by applying the rule.266
Hudson's effect is fairly broad: (1) it categorically limits the use
of the exclusionary rule on culpable police conduct if the court
determines that the violation was negligible (such as violating the
"knock and announce" requirement) and (2) that even if police
intentionally violate the Fourth Amendment, the deterrence
benefits still may not outweigh the costs. 267 Interestingly, the
Court's enumeration of costs in Hudson, are those costs that are
applicable to every application of the exclusionary rule 268; any type
of exclusionary rule will be at the cost of relevant and reliable
evidence. The important part of the analysis is to weigh those
obvious costs against the potential deterrence benefits.
Nonetheless, the Court's cost-benefit analysis seemed unduly
biased in favor of the costs to society, rather than a fair or accurate
balancing of the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary
rule.269
The implication from the Court's analysis in Hudson is that the
costs of applying the exclusionary rule vary with the crime allegedly
committed; a novel introduction into the cost-benefit analysis.270
The Court did not expound on this implication. 271 For instance,
would there be a greater cost of applying the exclusionary rule if the
police found more drugs, or if the exclusionary rule was being
applied to someone with a longer criminal record versus a first-time
offender? It appears these may be relevant costs to the Court's
analysis after Hudson, but the Court’s analysis leaves more
questions than answer regarding the nature of the cost-benefit
analysis.272
Herring expands the good-faith exception beyond its reach in
Hudson. The Court in Herring created new bright-line rules for

announce requirement)
264. See generally id. (exclusionary rule not applicable for violation of the knockand - announce requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
265. Id. at 596.
266. Id.
267. See id.; see also LaFave, supra note 3, §1.6(h).
268. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 605 (Breyer J., dissenting); see also LaFave, supra
note 3, § 1.6.
269. See generally Hudson, 547 U.S. 586 (Justice Scalia notes that application of
the exclusionary rule in this instance would amount to a "get-out-of-jail-free card.").
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See id.; see also LaFave, supra note 3.
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determining whether the federal exclusionary rule applies.273 These
rules purport to guide the Court in Its cost-benefit analysis.
However, the line demarcating when the federal exclusionary rule
is applicable using the cost-benefit analysis was only further
blurred with these new rules.274
In Herring, the Court had to decide whether an invalid arrest
warrant that erroneously appeared on a law enforcement data base,
that led to the defendant's arrest, and which uncovered possession
of drugs, should trigger the application of the exclusionary rule. 275
Significantly, the police were in complete control of their record
keeping system for warrants.276 Nevertheless, the police failed to
remove a five month old warrant that was no longer outstanding. 277
The issue presented was whether negligent record keeping of a
police database maintained and controlled by police provided a basis
for suppressing evidence found pursuant to the erroneous arrest
warrant.278
Initially, the facts in Herring seemed to weigh in favor of
suppression, even in light of the Court’s ruling in Hudson, that
certain culpable conduct is nevertheless negligible and therefore the
costs still outweigh the benefits. In Herring, there appeared to be
more potential and substantial deterrence benefits in applying the
exclusionary rule: the police were (1) in control of their own data
bases for warrants; (2) the deterrence benefits to be yielded were
high considering police can better monitor their system for valid
warrants, and (3) erroneous warrant record keeping by police can
foreseeably affect the constitutional rights of hundreds or
thousands of individuals.279 Despite all of this in favor of applying
the exclusionary rule, the Court found in favor of the state, holding
"the exclusionary rule does not apply to police record keeping
errors."280
Significantly, the Court reached this result by applying the
broad principle that "to trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct
273. Herring, 555 U.S. 135.
274. LaFave, supra note 3.
275. See id.; see also O'Neill, supra note 10 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court's
recent jurisprudence on exclusionary rule); compare Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (error arising
from county clerk's database), with Herring, 555 U.S. 135 (error arising from lawenforcement database).
276. Herring, 555 U.S. 135.
277. Id.
278.Id. Here that a police investigator learned that the defendant Herring went
to retrieve something from his impounded car. Id. A police officer who knew who
Herring was decided to check with the county’s warrant clerk for an outstanding
warrant on Herring. Id. Nothing was found. Id. However, a cursory check of the
neighboring county found an outstanding arrest warrant. Id. Acting on the
outstanding warrant in the neighboring county, the investigator arrested defendant
and found incident to arrest, drugs and a gun. Id. Minutes later the investigator
learned that the warrant was invalid as it was recalled 5 months earlier. Id.
279. See id.
280. Id.
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must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully
deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the
price paid by the justice system."281 Furthermore, the Court makes
clear that the benefits must outweigh the costs.282 The Court
explained that the deterrence benefit to be derived varies with the
degrees of culpability in the conduct. 283 Accordingly, the court
makes clear that isolated negligence is outside the reach of the
Fourth Amendment.284 Instead, in order to yield deterrence
benefits, the conduct by law enforcement must be "deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances
recurring or system negligence."285
The police conduct in Herring seemingly rose only to isolated
negligence.286 However, as the Dissent stressed, the Majority's
opinion in Herring rejects a fundamental theory of tort law: when
any entity is liable for lack of due care, this creates an incentive to
act with greater care next time.287 More broadly stated, the
Supreme Court's current version of the federal exclusionary rule
altogether rejects this fundamental premise of tort law. 288
Nevertheless, the Majority concluded that isolated negligence by
police officers does not yield sufficient deterrence benefits to
warrant application of the exclusionary rule.289
In all of the preceding cases, arguably, there was some form of
actual reliance by the police on the some external, seemingly
immutable, authority.290 This seemed to be a major factor that led
the Supreme Court to conclude that when police are doing their job
of fettering out crime, acting in good-faith, applying the
exclusionary rule in these somewhat atypical cases, would not
accomplish its purpose of police deterrence.291 Thus, prior to Davis,
the good-faith cases seemed to be limited to either: (a) non-

281. Id.; see also LaFave, supra note 3.
282.Herring, 555 U.S. at 145.
283. Id.
284. See LaFave, supra note 3.
285. Herring, 555 U.S. at 145.
286. Id.
287. Herring, 555 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (later-invalidated warrant issued by
magistrate); Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 990 (exclusionary rule inapplicable when warrant
is invalid due to judicial clerical error); Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (subsequently overturned
statute); Davis, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (later-reversed binding appellate precedent); Evans,
514 U.S. 1 (undiscovered error in court-maintained database); Herring, 555 U.S. 135
(undiscovered error in police-maintained database); see also LaFave, supra note 3, §
1.3 (noting actual reliance by a police officer as a necessary condition for application
of the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule).
291. Id.
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deterrable, isolated mistakes292, or (b) cases in which a police officer
relies upon a neutral third-party's authorization.293
The Court's opinion in Davis is significant because it has the
potential to quickly expand the reach of the good-faith exception
beyond the somewhat atypical cases 294, and into the more common
Fourth Amendment violations. 295 Davis, viewed together with the
prior good-faith cases296, can arguably support a "more general and
broader good-faith exception to the federal exclusionary rule. 297 In
effect, the good-faith exception could reach instances of Fourth
Amendment violations beyond those covered individually by any of
the preceding cases.298
In Davis, a police officer stopped and arrested the driver of a
vehicle for DUI.299 The defendant, a passenger, was then arrested
for giving police a false name.300 Ostensibly, acting under the
precedent interpreting New York v. Belton, police officers searched
the driver's car after both the driver and defendant were
handcuffed, and the scene was fully secured. 301 In the car, police
found a revolver in defendant's jacket, and charged the defendant
with possession of a firearm by a felon. 302 While the defendant's case
was pending, the Supreme Court reversed the Belton decision, in
Arizona v. Gant.303 The Gant decision thereby made the police
officer's search of the car and seizure of the gun unconstitutional. 304
The defendant moved to suppress the seizure of the revolver
because the search was unlawful.305 His motion was denied.306

292. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. 897, Krull 480 U.S. 340.
293. United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 190 (2014) (Greenaway Jr. J.,
dissenting).
294. Davis, 564 U.S. at 258 (Brennan J., dissenting). Arguably, Leon, Krull,
Evans and even Hudson and Herring are not as common. See id. The situation in
Davis would seem to arise with more frequency. Id.
295. Id. (arguing that the courts version of the exclusionary rule has the potential
to rapidly expand the good-faith exception). The dissent also notes how often motions
to suppress are filed. Id. This means that potentially the good-faith exception will
prevent defendant's from obtaining redress for their constitutional violation. Id.; see
also Katzin, 769 F.3d at 190 (Greenaway Jr. J., dissenting) (stating that it was the
Framers intent that the ultimate decision-making not be in the hands of law
enforcement officials).
296. See, e.g., Krull, 480 U.S. 340; Evans, 514 U.S. 1; Herring, 555 U.S. 135.
297. LaFave, supra note 3.
298. Id.
299. Davis, 564 U.S. at 235-36.
300. Id.
301. Id.; see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that incident
to a custodial arrest of an occupant of a motor vehicle, the police officer may search
the passenger compartment of the automobile).
302. Davis, 131 S.Ct. 2419
303. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
304. Id.
305. Davis, 564 U.S. at 236
306. Id.
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The critical issue on appeal was whether the federal
exclusionary rule applied when officers acted reasonably on binding
appellate precedent, later held unconstitutional. 307 The Supreme
Court held, even though the search by police was ultimately
unconstitutional, the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule
would not be most efficaciously served.308 The Court reiterated that
police action must be deliberate enough to yield meaningful
deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the
justice system, in order for exclusion to be warranted.309
The issue with Davis, is not necessarily the result, but the
exclusionary rule precedent that the Supreme Court created. Given
the facts of the defendant's case, and how the Court applied the
good-faith exception, the first question is what constitutes bindingappellate precedent?310 Binding appellate precedent often requires
the court to resolve complex legal questions of degree.311 For
instance, imagine an officer acted consistent with the language of a
Fourth Amendment rule that a court of appeals announced.312
However, suppose the facts before the officer were clearly
distinguishable from the case that announced the Fourth
Amendment rule, and therefore a court would likely hold that
specific rule does not apply.313 Consequently, the officer's conduct
would be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. So, would the goodfaith exception apply? Davis seems to suggest the exclusionary rule
would not apply if the officer objectively acted in good-faith under
this scenario.
The above is only one example where good-faith can be found
based on Davis. However, suppose another commons scenario: a
court of appeals creates precedent by ruling on a case with highly
analogous facts.314 If an officer, in good-faith, thought (but was
ultimately wrong) he was acting pursuant to precedent because he
in good-faith thought his actions were analogous to the precedent,
would good-faith be extended to this scenario?315 Based on Davis, it
is possible.
Another issue with Davis is whether actual reliance on
appellate precedent by the police is required.316 The Supreme Court
did not indicate whether the officer in Davis actually relied on, or
just that a reasonable officer could have relied on, the precedent of

307. Id. at 231.
308. Id. at 237.
309. Id. at 240.
310. Id. at 255 (Brennan J., dissenting).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See, e.g., Leflore, 32 N.E.3d 1043. Further, suppose a Fourth Amendment
rule is followed in all other jurisdictions except the defendant’s jurisdiction.
316. See LaFave, supra note 3.
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New York v. Belton.317 Objective reliance by police is self-evident
with a warrant.318 But what about when police do not have a neutral
third party, like they did not in Davis? It is not clear whether the
state could proffer evidence that a hypothetical objectively
reasonable officer could have relied on the appellate precedent, and
consequently avoid having the exclusionary rule applied.
All of these issues demonstrate the potential breadth of
circumstances that police conduct can be deemed non-culpable
under the holding in Davis.319 The Supreme Court's holding
requires sufficient deliberateness and culpability to warrant
suppression.320 Deliberateness goes to the Courts requirements of
intentional, or willful conduct by police in order to warrant applying
the exclusionary rule.321 The second requirement for applying the
exclusionary rule is that the police conduct must be sufficiently
culpable. However, culpability in the context of Davis suggests
something different than what it meant in past cases, where police
actually relied on a warrant, or even a statute, for their actions, and
the warrant or statue was later found erroneously issued or
passed.322
In Davis, the Court held police were not culpable despite acting
without a warrant.323 Very often, police act without a warrant. 324
This tends to suggest that in other instances where police are acting
without a warrant, they can also be found not culpable thereby
making the exclusionary rule inapplicable.325
For example, what is the difference between (1) an officer who
conducts a search without a warrant that he believe complies with
the Fourth Amendment, but which ends up ultimately falling just
outside the bounds of the Fourth Amendment and (2) an officer who
follows erroneous binding precedent, like in Davis?326 Worse, what
about an officer acting pursuant to suggestive precedent, as opposed
to binding precedent?327 Indeed, the Court's opinion seems to
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Davis, 564 U.S. at 255 (Brennan J., dissenting); see, e.g., Katzin, 769 F.3d
at 190 (Greenaway Jr. J., dissenting); Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1066-67 (Burke J.,
dissenting);
320. Davis, 564 U.S. at 255 (Brennan J., dissenting)
321. Id.
322. See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. 135.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1066-67 (Burke J., dissenting) (stating the court opens
up a general good-faith inquiry with its current holding).
326. Davis, 564 U.S. at 258 (Brennan J., dissenting); see, e.g., State v. Johnson
22 N.E.3d 1061 (Oh. 2014) (holding that good-faith exception applied since the officer
who attached a GPS device to a defendant's vehicle, had an objectively reasonable
belief that he did not need to obtain a warrant before doing so).
327. Davis, 564 U.S. at 258 (Brennan J., dissenting); see also Katzin, 769 F.3d at
190 (Greenaway Jr. J., dissenting) (stating that police made a deliberate decision
implicating constitutional principles on the basis of a 3-1 Circuit split, absent any
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suggest that an officer is not more culpable when he is acting
pursuant to persuasive or suggestive precedent, as opposed to
binding precedent.328
The fact is that in most scenarios, police officers are acting in
objective good faith, when faced with the facts before them.329
Importantly, however, police officers are likely not exactly sure, in
most instances, how the Fourth Amendment applies to the facts
before them.330 Therefore, it follows that in a significant number of
these cases, a court will find that police were wrong.331 When a court
finds police acted unconstitutionally, most of the time, the
exclusionary rule will be applied.332 However, Davis' holding seems
to suggest that the federal exclusionary rule will only apply to those
unlawful searches and seizures that are "egregiously
unreasonable."333 This is especially problematic when one considers
the frequency with which Fourth Amendment suppression motions
are filed.334 While the holding in Davis is likely to cause complex
legal argument, and police force confusion, at the end of the day, it
will be the defendant who loses, since his constitutional rights will
be violation, and he will be left without remedy.335
Between Hudson, Herring and Davis, the good-faith exception
has the potential to swallow the exclusionary rule.336 Further, these
cases, Davis in particular, seems to create a categorical bar to
obtaining redress for defendants in every case pending when
precedent is overturned.337 Illinois Courts are not constrained by
authorization for their conduct); Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1066-67 (Burke J., dissenting)
(stating the majority's alternative holding was based on a broad reading of dicta in
Davis, 564 U.S. 229 and it also invites lower courts to conduct a general "good-faith"
inquiry, not limited by the facts or circumstances in Davis or any other Supreme
Court case). In Leflore, the dissent argued that the precedent that officers relied upon
was not binding, that the police could not have reasonably relied upon it. Id. at 1073.
The dissent also argued that the precedent that the officers ostensibly relied upon,
did not authorize the specific acts that the officers did. Id. Rather, it authorized
similar, but distinct act. Id.
328. Davis, 564 U.S. at 257-58 (Brennan J., dissenting); see also Katzin, 769 F.3d
at 190 (Greenaway Jr. J., dissenting); see also Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1066-67 (Burke
J., dissenting) (lower courts interpreting Davis, 564 U.S. 229, are not limited by the
facts or circumstances in Davis or any other Supreme Court case).
329. Davis, 564 U.S. at 257-58 (Brennan J., dissenting)
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.; Katzin, 769 F.3d at 196 (Greenaway Jr. J., dissenting) (arguing the
majority's good-faith analysis is flawed because it finds that, where the law is
unsettled, police may act in a constitutionally reckless way and still reap the benefits
of the good-faith exception).
334. Davis, 564 U.S. at 258 (Brennan J., dissenting).
335. See id.
336. Id.; see also Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1063 (Burke J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority's holding, pursuant to Supreme Court's holding in Davis, 563 U.S. 229,
has the potential result in "the erosion, and possible destruction of the exclusionary
rule. . . .").
337. Id.
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the analytical framework used by the United States Supreme
Court.338 So the next question is: where does the United States
Supreme Court's position on the federal exclusionary rule leave
Illinois courts with the state exclusionary rule?

D. The Federal Exclusionary Rule Rationale
Juxtaposed with Illinois' State Exclusionary Rule
Rationale
The federal exclusionary rule currently is applied using the
framework laid out in Herring and Davis.339 Accordingly, the costbenefit analysis is (1) narrow in scope with police deterrence as its
primary objective, with an emphasis on societal costs340; (2)
ostensibly does not require police to actually rely 341 on a neutral
third-party authority (i.e. search warrant issued by judge or statute
authorizing a police act)342 to effectuate a search and seizure; and,
(3) requires a high level of police culpability (intent, conscious
disregard, or systemic negligence), in order to justify application of
the rule.343 The clear result of the United States Supreme Court's
cost-benefit analysis framework is: the "good-faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule is exponentially broadening, such that more
Fourth Amendment violations fall within the purview of the goodfaith exception.344 In the words of Justice Scalia, the federal
exclusionary rule is truly becoming the Court's "last resort."345
Illinois Courts have in some instances applied the federal
exclusionary rule via the Fourteenth Amendment. 346 However, in
other instances, they have explicitly applied the state exclusionary
rule arising out of Article I Section 6.347 As it turns out, the analysis
Illinois courts have employed in determining the applicability of the
state exclusionary rule is (1) not as narrow in scope and (2) is not

338. See O'Neill, supra note 66.
339. See, e.g., Davis, 564 U.S. 229 (discussing the cost-benefit analysis in
determining whether to apply federal exclusionary rule).
340. See Hudson, 547 U.S. 586; see also Herring, 555 U.S. 135.
341. Hudson, 547 U.S. 586; see also Herring, 555 U.S. 135.
342. Hudson, 547 U.S. 586; see also Herring, 555 U.S. 135.
343. Hudson, 547 U.S. 586; see also Herring, 555 U.S. 135.
344. Davis, 564 U.S. at 258 (Brennan J., dissenting).; Leflore, 32 N.E.3d 1043.
345. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 ("suppression of evidence, however, has always
been our last resort, not our first impulse").
346. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 901 N.E.2d 252 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2009)
(applying federal exclusionary rule); see also People v. Boyer 713 N.E.2d 655 (Ill.
App. Ct. 3d Dist 1999) (applying federal exclusionary rule).; see also People v.
Holmes, 45 N.E.3d 326 (1st App. Dist. 2015) (applying state exclusionary rule); see
also People v. Horton, No. 1-14-2019, 2017 WL 1274307, at *8 (1st App. Dist. 2017)
(applying state exclusionary rule).
347. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 (1996); People v. Wright, 697 N.E. 2d 693, 697 (Ill.
1998) (affirming that the exclusionary rule arising from Article I section 6 provides
greater protection than the exclusionary rule arising from the Fourth Amendment).
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limited in its purpose to solely police deterrence.348 Therefore, the
state exclusionary rule is more broadly applicable to Fourth
Amendment (and Article I Section 6) violations.
In People v. Stewart, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the
good-faith exception to the state exclusionary rule pursuant to
Article I Section 6.349 However, the Illinois Supreme Court did not
provide a reason for adopting the Leon good-faith exception.350
Furthermore, the court did not explicitly state that the Supreme
Court's cost-benefit analysis was the mode for determining the
application of the Leon good-faith exception for Article I Section 6
purposes.351 Rather, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the
good-faith exception, as it was applied in Leon, accorded with the
dictates of the Illinois Constitution.352
However, unlike the United States Supreme Court in Krull,
the Illinois Supreme Court did not extend the good-faith exception
to statutes later-declared unconstitutional.353 Instead, the court
found that the state exclusionary rule applied to suppress evidence
gathered pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. 354 Accordingly,
People v. Krueger marked a point of departure for Illinois in terms
of the rationale used by the court in determining when to apply the
state exclusionary rule.355
In People v. Krueger the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Krull.356 The
348. See Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 (1996).
349. People v. Stewart, 473 N.E.2d 1227 (1984); accord, People v. Bohan, 511
N.E.2d. 1384 (1984): see also 725 ILCS 5/114-12 (codifying Leon).
350. See Stewart, 471 N.E.2d at 1233 (stating "the agents reasonable and goodfaith belief, although a possibly mistaken one, that the searches were authorized
under the warrants, insulated the searches from a motion to suppress."). The court
in Stewart however only cited to the Leon case, and never stated that if this was the
rule under Article I section 6. Id.
351. Stewart, 471 N.E.2d at 1233
352. Id.
353. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60.
354. Id.
355. Id. (the majority adopted justice O’Connor’s rationale in Krull, 480 U.S.
340).
356. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60. In this case the majority relied heavily on Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Krull, 480 U.S. 340. Id. The court first determined that the
statute purporting to allow police to enter without knocking was unconstitutional.
Id. The next issue was whether the good-faith exception applied so as to prevent the
evidence from being excluded at trial. Id. The court stated: "Justice O'Connor's
dissent revealed several serious flaws in the majority's decision. She pointed out that
this newly created exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule provides a
grace period for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation, during which time
the State is permitted to violate constitutional requirements with impunity."
Further, Justice O'Connor did not find the majority's extension of the good-faith
exception to be supported by Leon 's rationale. Id. She persuasively distinguished
Leon on the following grounds. Id. First, there is a “powerful historical basis for the
exclusion of evidence gathered pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. Id. Not only
were such statutes “the core concern of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment,” the
exclusionary rule had regularly been applied to suppress evidence gathered under
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issue in Kruger was whether a "no-knock" statute was valid.357 In
part I of its holding the court ruled that the statute was
unconstitutional.358 The Court found the statute violated the
reasonableness requirement set out in the Fourth Amendment and
Article I Section 6 because it allowed police to enter without
knocking based solely on an occupant’s prior possession of
firearms.359 The court decided that the statute was unconstitutional
because it was unreasonable under both Article I Section 6 and the
Fourth Amendment.360
In part II of its holing the Court turned to the ultimate issue of
whether to apply the state exclusionary rule to suppress the
evidence that was gathered pursuant to a statute that violated both
Article I Section 6 and the Fourth Amendment.361 The court began
by characterizing the case as one about remedies and not
interpretation.362 Therefore, Krull was only controlling as to the
exclusionary rule arising out of the Fourth Amendment, the federal
exclusionary rule.363 Despite construing Article I Section 6 and the
Fourth Amendment in "lockstep" fashion, the court was able to
employ an independent analysis regarding whether exclusion was
permissible under the Illinois constitution. 364 The Illinois Supreme
Court held "we are not willing to recognize an exception to our state
exclusionary rule that will provide a grace period for
unconstitutional searches and seizure…during which time our
citizens prized constitutional rights can be violated with
impunity."365

unconstitutional statutes. Id. Second, Justice O'Connor found this history
illustrative of the fact that the relevant state actors in Krull—legislators—often pose
a serious threat to fourth amendment values." Id. "[T]he judicial role is
particularized, fact-specific and nonpolitical. Legislative acts sweep broadly and
affect whole classes of searches." Id.
357. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d. 605 (the unconstitutional statutes allowed police to
enter a person's house on less than probable cause). The court stated that they would
construe both constitutions as offering the same level of protection, apparently
acknowledging the lockstep test and when it would be permissible to depart on the
basis of interpretation. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. The court said that this was unconstitutional because it did not create
any exigent circumstances and thus it was unreasonable not to announce entry. Id.
Unless the officers have a reasonable belief that an occupant will use a firearm
against them if they proceed with the ordinary announcements will not announcing
be constitutional. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. The Court adhered to the "limited lockstep" doctrine on interpreting the
issue of whether the statute violated the Fourth Amendment and thus Article I
section 6. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. Krull was only controlling as to the federal constitution exclusionary
rule. Compare Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604 with Krull, 480 U.S. 340.
364. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604. Under the federal exclusionary rule, the good-faith
exception would have applied. See Krull, 480 U.S. 340.
365. Krueger, 675 N.E. 2d. 604; see also People v. Carrera, 783 N.E 2d 15 (Ill.
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The court justified its holding on three separate grounds.366
First, the court relied on the distinction between a judge and a
legislature.367 Judges actions typically affect only one person at a
time, while legislatures actions affect thousands, if not millions, of
people at a time.368 Thus, this scenario was distinct from the
scenario in Leon where a judge issued a warrant that was based on
less than probable cause.369
The court’s second rationale was the fact that there would be
no effective remedy for the defendant convicted as the result of the
constitutional violation.370 This would leave no incentive for the
aggrieved defendant to challenge a statute as unconstitutional if he
would still be convicted upon it.371 Finally, the court was persuaded
by the powerful historical basis for excluding evidence gathered
pursuant to a search authorized by an unconstitutional statute. 372
The court found that it was precisely these statutes that were the
"core concern of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment." 373
Moreover, the court noted that the exclusionary rule had regularly
been applied to suppress evidence gathered under unconstitutional
statutes.374
In reaching their holding, the Krueger court importantly rested
It's decision on state constitutional grounds. 375 The court also
distinctly noted the state test that determines whether to apply the
state exclusionary rule.376 The court stated that for purposes of the
state exclusionary rule, in evaluating whether to apply the state
exclusionary rule Illinois courts must "carefully balance the
legitimate aims of law enforcement against the right of our citizens
to be free from unreasonable government intrusion." 377 The court
specifically distinguished the state balancing test from the costbenefit test the Supreme Court used in Leon and Krull.378 In doing
2002).

366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See id.; see also Krull, 480 U.S. at 365 (O'Connor J., dissenting) ("A judicial

officer's unreasonable authorization of a search warrant affects one person at a time;
a legislature's unreasonable authorization of searches may affect thousands or
millions and will almost always affect more than one.").
369. Id.; see also LaFave, supra note 3.
370. See Krueger, 675 N.E. 2d. 604; see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 258 (Brennan J.,
dissenting).
371. See id.; see also Gersch, 553 N.E.2d at 287.
372. Krueger, 675 N.E. 2d at 610; See also Krull (O'Connor J., dissenting)
373. Krueger, 675 N.E. 2d at 610; See also Krull (O'Connor J., dissenting)
374. Krueger, 675 N.E. 2d at 610. The court also found that the exception to the
good-faith exception laid out in Krull, 480 U.S. 340 was unrealistic and hard to apply.
Id.
375. Id.
376. Krueger, 675 N.E. 2d at 610; but cf. Davis, 564 U.S. 229 (using the costbenefit approach in determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule).
377. Krueger, 675 N.E. 2d at 610.
378. Id.(comparing the balancing test from Tisler, (state test) to that in Leon and
Krull (federal test)).
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so, the court found that the price was too high for letting
unconstitutional search and seizure legislation violate the citizens’
rights with impunity.379 Thus, the court applied the state
exclusionary rule as the remedy.380
The significance of this Court's test is that it is distinctly
broader than the test for the applicability of the federal exclusionary
rule.381 Recall that the test in Herring is (1) Benefits must outweigh
the costs and (2) there must be sufficient culpability of police
conduct to make it "worth it" to apply the federal exclusionary
rule.382 Conversely, Illinois courts employ more of a broad balancing
test, with no rigid requirements, in determining whether to apply
the state exclusionary rule arising out of Article I section 6. 383
Importantly, the balancing test the court employs does not
recognize government reliance on an unconstitutional statute as a
basis for the good-faith exception.384 The benefit of the balancing
test for determining the applicability of the Illinois state
exclusionary rule is that it is not bound by a set of tightly
circumscribed rules governing its application. 385 Thus, it balances

379. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d at 610.
380. Id. The court applied the state exclusionary rule because the federal
exclusionary rule did not apply. See Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (applying the good-faith
exception to the federal exclusionary rule). It did not apply because in Krull,
pursuant to the cost-benefit analysis by the Supreme Court, the benefits of applying
the rule did not outweigh the costs. Id.
381. Id.; see also Carrera, 783 N.E.2d 15 (rejecting the good-faith exception to
the state exclusionary rule when officers effectuated an extraterritorial arrest
pursuant to a statute that was later declared unconstitutional). Importantly, in
Carrera, the court relied on the fact that if It applied the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, It would effectively "resurrect the [unconstitutional] amendment
and provide a grace period [of four years] during which our citizens would have been
subject to extraterritorial arrests without proper authorization." Id. at 24. In so
holding, the court in Carrera used expansive language stating that the void ab initio
doctrine "applies equally to legislative acts which are unconstitutional because they
violate substantive constitutional guarantees and those that are unconstitutional
because they are adopted in violation of the single subject clause of our constitution."
Id. at 22; see also Holmes, 45 N.E. at 333 (concluding that applying the good-faith
exception to the state exclusionary rule would run counter to Illinois' void ab inito
jurisprudence and the void ab initio doctrine precludes the good-faith exception's
application in this state). The court in Holmes also noted the expansive language the
Illinois Supreme Court used in Carrera in stating that the void ab initio doctrine
applied to both substantive and procedural guarantees by the Illinois Constitution.
See id.
382. Herring, 555 U.S. 135.
383. See, e.g., Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604 (employing a balancing test different from
the United States Supreme Court's cost-benefits test); see also Tisler, 469 N.E.2d. at
161.
384. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604; Carrera, 783 N.E.2d 15;
385. Compare Davis, 564 U.S. 229 (finding that the test in determining whether
the exclusionary rule applies is whether the police were sufficiently culpable and
acted in a sufficiently deliberate way in order to justify exclusion) with Kreuger, 675
N.E.2d 604 (finding that the goal of the court is to balance legitimate aims with the
right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion).
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both the "costs" of applying the rule and the "costs" of not applying
the rule.386
Additionally, Illinois courts still recognize judicial integrity as
a valid purpose of the state exclusionary rule.387 Accordingly, the
state exclusionary rule is also broader in this respect.388 Illinois
courts have found that the exclusionary rule is designed to promote
individual and institutional compliance at all branches of
government with the constitutional mandate against unreasonable
government invasions of privacy in order to vindicate individual
rights.389 This important purpose makes up part of the balance of
interests Illinois considers when determining whether to apply the
state exclusionary rule.390
The jurisprudence of the state exclusionary rule is distinct
from that of the federal exclusionary rule.391 Therefore, consider the
scenarios in Evans, Hudson, Herring, and Davis, applying the state
exclusionary rule, instead of the federal exclusionary rule. The court
in Krueger stated that the fact that legislators can affect many
people's constitutional rights with impunity was a major factor in
deciding whether to apply the state exclusionary rule. 392 The court
reasoned that the balance of interests weighed in favor of applying
the exclusionary rule since many people potentially could have their
constitutional rights violated.393 This seems to suggest that in a
situation like Evans and Herring, where erroneous record keeping
by either the county clerk, or the police lead to a defendant's false
arrest, Illinois courts, considering the state exclusionary rule would
be more inclined to find that the state exclusionary rule applies.
Additionally, the result in Davis would likely be different if an
Illinois court applied the state exclusionary rule. 394 In Davis police
were acting pursuant to binding appellate precedent that was later
found unconstitutional when the defendant was arrested. 395 Similar
to Krull, the unconstitutional precedent could affect thousands,

386. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604.
387. People v. McGee, 644 N.E.2d 439 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1994).
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1066-67 (Burke J., dissenting) (stating the balance of
interests Illinois courts use when determining whether to prohibit the extension of
the good-faith exception which include (1) the number of people affected (2) the
effective remedy for the aggrieved defendant and (2) the historical basis for
exclusion).
391. See generally Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604; accord Wright, 697 N.E.2d 693; see
also Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1066-67 (Burke J., dissenting).
392. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604; see also Carrera, 783 N.E.2d 15; see also Holmes,
45 N.E.3d 326; accord Horton, 2017 WL 1274307, *7 (holding that the void ab initio
doctrine preclude application of the good-faith exception).
393. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604.
394. See Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1066-67 (Burke J., dissenting) (stating the same
concerns that the Illinois Supreme Court found in Krull, are also present in Davis).
395. Davis, 564 U.S. 229.
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even millions, of people.396 Further, it allows police, not a third party
neutral, to violate citizen’s rights. 397 When police search or seize
someone or something without a warrant, they take the risk of being
wrong, and in violation of the core of Article I Section 6
protections.398 The state exclusionary rule is well tailored to hold
law enforcement accountable for their mistakes in this regard. 399
Thus, the balance of interests would also likely tip in favor of
applying the state exclusionary rule. The state exclusionary rule
has the potential to protect these constitutional violations where the
federal exclusionary rule would not.400

IV. PROPOSAL
The foregoing analysis has explored the differing rationales for
applying the federal exclusionary rule and the state exclusionary
rule. Particularly, the United States Supreme Court's use of the
cost-benefit analysis to narrow the scope of the federal exclusionary
rule as well as the Court's abandonment of the original purposes for
applying the exclusionary rule.401 Illinois courts have a distinct
rationale for applying the state exclusionary rule that make it more
broadly applicable than the federal exclusionary rule. The recent
stark change in federal law provides an impetus for Illinois courts
to apply their state exclusionary rule.402
For Illinois courts, when there is a Fourth Amendment (and
thus a corresponding Article I Section 6) violation, the court is not
encumbered by the "limited lockstep doctrine" in applying the state
exclusionary rule.403 Nevertheless, if the court chooses to apply the
federal exclusionary rule, or rather, does not decide the case
specifically stating they are relying on the state exclusionary rule,
then the United States Supreme Court will have jurisdiction to hear
the case.404 However, if Illinois courts explicitly choose to apply the
state exclusionary rule, this prevents the United States Supreme
Court from reversing an Illinois court's application of the state
396. See Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1066-67 (Burke J., dissenting).
397. Id.
398. See Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1074 (Burke J., dissenting) ("Where state courts
are silent on the constitutionality of a particular police practice, law enforcement
officers who engage in that practice without first obtaining a search warrant from a
neutral magistrate must knowingly accept the risk that their conduct will be found
unconstitutional.").
399. Katzin, 769 F.3d at 190 (Greenaway Jr. J., dissenting).
400. See generally Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1066 (Burke J., dissenting).
401. Compare Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 and Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 with Davis, 564 U.S.
229.
402. See Guzman, 842 P.2 660.
403. See generally Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604.
404. See O'Neill, supra note 11 (making the point that if Illinois courts rely
strictly on a state constitutional provision, and make it explicit in the opinion, the
United State Supreme Court will not have jurisdiction to hear the case thereby
insulating the Illinois court's decision from being reversed by the Supreme Court).
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exclusionary rule, and instead, applying the federal exclusionary
rule.405
I propose that when Illinois courts find that there is a
constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment (and thus Article
I Section 6) Illinois courts should specifically apply the state
exclusionary rule that arises out of Article I Section 6 of the Illinois
constitution.406 In applying the state exclusionary rule as a remedy
for Article I Section 6 constitutional violations, Illinois courts can
(1) avoid engaging in the unworkable cost-benefit analysis that the
United States Supreme Court employs in determining the
applicability of the federal exclusionary rule while simultaneously
promoting their own judicial independence; (2) better protect the
constitutional rights of Illinois residents by providing an effective
remedy for Article I Section 6 violations (and Fourth Amendment
violations); (3) better promote institutional compliance with the
Article I section 6 (and the Fourth Amendment); (4) comport more
closely with the language of the Illinois constitution; 407 and (5)
comport more closely with the original justification, and Illinois
precedent, for applying the state exclusionary rule. 408
First, by applying the state exclusionary rule explicitly, Illinois
courts can altogether avoid engaging in the current cost-benefit
analysis employed by the Supreme Court.409 The cost-benefit
analysis is currently very malleable and inconsistent in its
application.410 This allows the Supreme Court to continually limit
the effect of the federal exclusionary rule. 411 Further, the federal
exclusionary rule is not being applied in a principled fashion.412
405. See O'Neill, supra note 11.
406. See Herring, 555 U.S. 135 (Ginsberg J., dissenting) (stating that the
exclusionary rule is a remedy necessary to ensure that the Fourth Amendment's
prohibitions are observed in fact).
407. See Ill. Const. art. I, § 12, (1970) ("every person shall find a certain remedy
in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy,
property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and
promptly.").
408. See generally Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728; see also Leven, supra note 70.
409. See, e.g., Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (stating that in order for the federal
exclusionary rule to apply, police action must be sufficiently deliberate as well as
sufficiently culpable).
410. See, e.g., Katzin, 769 F.3d at 196 (Smith J., dissenting) ("If what the majority
is suggesting is that law enforcement officers may rely not just on holding, which are
truly the stuff of precedent, but also on appellate court rationale, I find such a
suggestion both troubling and impractical.").
411. Id.
412. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 940 (Brennan J., dissenting) (finding that it is an
impossible task to balance the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule in an honest
and accurate way and ultimately the court acts on its unstable intuition, hunches,
and occasional pieces of partial and often inconclusive data); see also Oakes, 598 A.2d
at 126 (stating the federal exclusionary rule's cost-benefit analysis is of no value
because the costs and benefits the court purports to weigh cannot reliably be
balanced with an precision). There is not enough empirical data for the costs and
benefits for a good-faith exception to be accurately and honestly assessed. Id. One of
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Illinois courts can avoid this by applying the state exclusionary rule.
The state exclusionary rule has been applied in a more principled
way, primarily because Illinois uses a broader balancing test that
considers more than the limited cost-benefit analysis considers.413
Another benefit of applying the state exclusionary rule is that
Illinois courts will avoid being reversed by the United States
Supreme Court, due to an alleged misapplication of the federal
exclusionary rule.414 As a result, Illinois courts will be more
judicially independent and autonomous. 415 At the same time,
Illinois courts can avoid the problems with the Supreme Court's
current version of the cost-benefit analysis.416
Second, by applying the state exclusionary rule Illinois courts
can avoid situations where the defendant is effectively left without
a remedy, despite having his constitutional rights violated. 417
Currently, the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to exclude
evidence that was gathered pursuant to an unconstitutional
statute, or to record-keeping errors by police or the county clerks, or
pursuant to an officer acting pursuant to binding appellate
precedent that is later held unconstitutional. 418 It is settled law that
Illinois state exclusionary rule does not recognize a good-faith

the reasons the benefits of the exclusionary rule is hard to measure is because it
consists of non-events. Id. In other words, if police comply with the Fourth
Amendment produces a non- event because there is no illegal search. Id.; see Katzin,
769 F.3d at 196 (Smith J., dissenting). Justice Smith stated that the majority's
framework, ostensibly allowing police to rely on appellate court rationale, provided
not limiting principle for the court and was therefore troubling. Id.
413. See Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604; see also Carrera, 783 N.E.2d 15; see also
Holmes, 45 N.E.3d 326; Accord Horton, 2017 WL 1274307, *7 (holding that the void
ab initio doctrine preclude application of the good-faith exception).
414. O'Neill, supra note 11.
415. See generally Leven, supra note 70.
416. See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 196 (Smith J., dissenting).
417. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 258 (Brennan J., dissenting) (arguing that when the
exclusionary rule does not apply to precedent later-declared unconstitutional,
defendant effectively has not remedy for the constitutional violation); see also Kerr,
supra 197, at 1096 (stating the exclusionary rule is the only remedy that can address
the constitutional violation to the defendant in a criminal case and the civil remedies
are not sufficient or likely); see also People v. Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 287 (Ill. 1990)
(stating that "[t]o hold a judicial decision that declares a statute unconstitutional is
not retroactive would forever prevent those injured under the unconstitutional
legislative act from receiving a remedy for the deprivation of a guaranteed right.").
If a judicial decision that declared a statute unconstitutional was not retroactive,
this would clearly offend all sense of due process under for the Federal and State
constitutions. Id. This rationale would seem to apply to preclude application of the
good-faith exception to the state exclusionary rule for unconstitutional acts by police,
since acts by police that violate a defendant's constitutional rights, if the good-faith
exception applies, effectively leave the defendant without a remedy for the
constitutional violation. See generally id. The good-faith exception allows a defendant
to be prosecuted with evidence gathered under an unconstitutional act. Id.
418. See, e.g., Davis, 564 U.S. 229 (federal exclusionary rule does not apply to
statutes later-declared unconstitutional); Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (federal exclusionary
rule does not apply to statutes later-declared unconstitutional).
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exception when police obtain evidence pursuant to an
unconstitutional statute.419 Many of these same concerns are
present when a police officer acts pursuant to appellate precedent
later declared unconstitutional.420 Thus, the state exclusionary rule
should also be applied when police officers are acting pursuant to
unconstitutional precedent. 421 By applying the state exclusionary
rule instead of the federal exclusionary rule, Illinois courts will
vindicate individual rights.422
Third, applying the state exclusionary rule will better promote
institutional compliance with the dictates of Article I Section 6 (and
the Fourth Amendment).423 A liberal application of the exclusionary
rule as the vehicle for enforcing Fourth Amendment and Article I
Section 6 violations has a tendency to promote institutional
compliance with the Fourth Amendment's requirements, especially
on the part of law enforcement agencies. 424 Thus, the overall benefit
would be more thorough police work, more vigilant judges in issuing
warrants, and more thorough legislators in promulgating
constitutional laws.425 The Supreme Court's current version of the
exclusionary rule has a tendency to embolden law enforcement
because they can rely on the good-faith exception to "extricate them
from nearly any evidentiary conundrum."426 This however is at the
419. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604; Wright, 697 N.E. 2d 693; see also Carrera, 783
N.E.2d 15.
420. Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1066-67 (Burke J., dissenting).
421. But see Leflore, 32 N.E.3d at 1043 (applying the federal exclusionary rule).
422. McGee, 644 N.E.2d at 447 (finding the exclusionary rule vindicates
individual rights). The court here also found that the exclusionary rule encourages
compliance by the legislative and executive branches of government. Id. Further, it
induces scrutiny and guidance from the judicial branch of Illinois. Id. Importantly,
the exclusionary rule "permits courts to honor the Constitution other than to merely
note its breach." Id.
423. Id. ("The exclusionary rule is not intended to punish, but it is designed to
promote both individual and institutional compliance with the constitutional
mandate against unreasonable government invasions of privacy."). The state
exclusionary rule encourages the legislature to enact constitutional laws, the
executive to uphold its oath to support the Illinois constitution, and induces scrutiny
and guidance from the judicial branch in Illinois. Id.
424. See generally Guzman, 842 P.2 660 (noting that the Supreme Court's
cost/benefit analysis only captures on comparatively minor element of the generally
acknowledge purposes of the exclusionary rule); See also Herring, 555 U.S. at 148
(Ginsberg J., dissenting) (finding that not applying the exclusionary rule generally
rejects a foundations premise of tort law which is that liability for negligence creates
a incentive to act with greater care). Just as respondent superior liability encourages
employers to supervise their employees, this theory would encourage policy makers
and systems managers to monitor the performance of the systems they install. See
id.
425. See generally Guzman, 842 P.2 660 (finding that in general the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule underestimates the benefits of the rule and
overstates the costs and also that the exception in general creates sloppier
magistrate and police work, making the state less inclined to follow the directives of
the Fourth Amendment).
426. Katzin, 769 F.3d at 188 (Greenaway Jr. J., dissenting).
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cost of citizens constitutional rights. Applying the state
exclusionary rule can help avoid this consequence, and encourage
law enforcement officials to "err on the side of constitutional
behavior," especially in the face of unsettled or equivocal Fourth
Amendment law.427
Fourth, applying the state exclusionary rule will comport more
closely with other provisions of the Illinois' Constitution.
Specifically, Article I Section 12, which states "every person shall
find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which
he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. 428 He shall
obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly." 429
Accordingly, applying the state exclusionary rule will more
effectively comport with Article I Section 12 in providing a prompt
remedy to those who have had their constitutional rights injured by
an unreasonable government search or seizure. 430 In contrast, the
United States Supreme Court’s rationale for applying the
exclusionary rule has effectively left some people with practically no
remedy.431 Additionally, application of the state exclusionary rule
will avoid Illinois courts allowing two constitutional violations to go
without remedy: the Fourth Amendment and Article I Section 6.
Ultimately, the state exclusionary rule will better protect both
constitutional provisions, as well as comport more closely with the
philosophy expressed in Article I section 12.
Fifth, by applying the state exclusionary rule, Illinois courts
will be adhering more closely to their own precedent for its
application, as well as another important purpose for its
application: to see that judicial integrity is maintained and to
prevent the further violation of constitutional rights. When the
Illinois Supreme Court first stated that it would exclude illegally
seized evidence, the court explained that this was necessary unless
the constitution guaranteeing these rights was to be made "a mere
nullity and our boasted rights of liberty…vain."432 The clear
implication was that the state exclusionary rule was a mandatory
remedy.

427. Davis, 564 U.S at 251 (Sotomayor J., concurring); see also Leflore, 32 N.E.3d
at 1073 (Burke J., dissenting).
428. Ill. Const. art. I, § 12 (1970); see also Gersch, 553 N.E.2d at 287.
429. Ill. Const. art. I, § 12 (1970).
430. Davis, 564 U.S. at 258 (Brennan J., dissenting) ("defendant has no effective
redress when good-faith is applied").
431. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 604 (Ginsberg J., dissenting) (finding that the not
applying the exclusionary rule under certain circumstances effectively leaves the
defendant was no remedy whatsoever for the constitutional violation because of the
high unlikelihood that there would be any civil remedy, in tort or otherwise).
432. See Brocamp, 138 N.E. at 731-32. In addition, the court in Brocamp then
agreed with the defendant that "the constitutional guarantees the rights of the
defendant in criminal case . . . [and for violations thereof] there must, of necessity,
be a remedy." Id.
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Further, the rule was necessary to preserve the integrity of our
constitution and courts. Since it is the duty of our courts to faithfully
uphold the constitution, it was necessarily the courts' duty to see
that illegally seized evidence was not used to convict a defendant. 433
Otherwise, the courts would be effectively acquiescing in illegality,
and thereby not upholding the constitution it was sworn to uphold.
The rationale for excluding unlawfully seized evidence started as a
matter of judicial integrity, and at the same time, it served to deter
police and government agents from committing constitutional
violations.434 The Illinois exclusionary rule has never been limited
to solely police deterrence.435

V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment is a one of the most important rights
contained in our Constitution. It prevents the government from
arbitrarily invading our privacy, our possessions, and our person.
The exclusionary rule is necessary for the Fourth Amendment to be
observed "in fact."436 The United States Supreme Court has created
the cost-benefit analysis for determining when to apply the federal
exclusionary rule.437 So far, this analysis has allowed the state to
introduce evidence that was seized pursuant to: invalid warrants,
unconstitutional statutes, erroneous precedent, police errors, clerk
errors, or otherwise unreasonable searches and seizures that violate
the Fourth Amendment.438 These cases are merely illustrations of
good faith, not limitations on the expansion of the good-faith
doctrine. Thus, the good-faith exception to the federal exclusionary
rule can, and likely will, continue to expand.
It is the Fourth Amendment that puts the restraints on police
work and government action in general. The exclusionary rule is the
vehicle for ensuring these protections are honored. Accordingly, it
is surprising that the Supreme Court considers the federal
exclusionary rule "a last resort."439 Further, if the exclusionary rule
433. See People v. Horton, No. 1-14-2019, 2017 IL App (1st) 142019 (2017) ("We
cannot sidestep or disregard instruction from both the United States and Illinois
Supreme Courts to achieve a specific outcome."); see also Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728.
434. See generally McGee, 644 N.E.2d 439 (finding that even if the state
exclusionary rule is merely a remedy, the court would have an obligation to ensure
that the remedy effectuates the state constitutional right to privacy). The Court
found that an important purpose of the exclusionary rule was to preserve judicial
integrity because the judiciary cannot tolerate evidence gathering practices that
violate the constitution. Id.
435. Id.; see generally Part III.
436. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 152 (Ginsberg J., dissenting)
437. See generally Part III.
438. Id.
439. See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1392 (1983) (finding that much of the criticism leveled at the
exclusionary rule is misdirected and that it is more properly directed at the Fourth
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is the only the vehicle for effectuating the protections of the Fourth
Amendment so they are observed "in fact," what the court is really
saying is that the Fourth Amendment does not always apply." 440
Illinois courts do not have to follow suit. The "limited lockstep"
doctrine does not bar application of the state exclusionary rule.
Further, applying the state exclusionary rule means that Illinois
courts do not need to engage in the Supreme Court's cost-benefit
analysis. Importantly, the state exclusionary rule provides greater
protection than the federal exclusionary rule. It is equally
important that the protections afforded under Article I Section 6 not
be diminished by a permanently pervading adoption of the goodfaith exception to the federal exclusionary rule.441 Therefore, rather
than following the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the federal
exclusionary rule, Illinois courts should apply the state exclusionary
rule for Article I Section 6 violations. This will allow Illinois courts
to honor the Constitution, rather than merely note its breach.442

Amendment itself). The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of the
police but rather the Fourth Amendment does. Id. Furthermore, the fact that officers
who obey the prohibitions of the fourth amendment will invariably catch more
criminals is a price the framers anticipated and were willing to pay to ensure the
sanctity of the person, home, and property against unrestrained governmental
power. Id.; see also Hudson, 547 U.S. 586. (finding that the exclusionary rule is an
extreme remedy that in some instances amount to a get out of jail free card and
therefore is only justified under very limited circumstances).
440. See generally id.
441. Guzman, 842 P.2 at 668.
442. McGee, 644 N.E. 2d 439. It is the Fourth Amendment which limits the
government in gathering evidence of a crime, not the exclusionary rule. Id.

